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CASE NOTES
Civil Practice - Attachment lien Not Property Subject to Attachment.
-The defendant corporation had attached funds of the X corporation to satisfy
any judgment which it might obtain in its action against X. Subsequently, the
plaintiff brought separate actions against defendant for money claims and since
defendant was a foreign corporation, procured warrants of attachment against
defendant's property. Thereafter, on stipulation between defendant and X, the
New York Supreme Court, Special Term, ordered the sheriff to release to X the
fund defendant had attached. Plaintiff's companion motions to vacate this
order and to restrain the sheriff from releasing the fund, held denied. Whle
plaintiff's attachment of defendant's property reaches defendant's cause of action
against X, the attached fund in that action is security alone, not part of the
action, and therefore not an interest of defendant such as to be subject to plain-
tiff's attachment. Reich v. Spiegel, 208 Misc. 225, 140 N.Y.S. 2d 722 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
As employed in English courts as early as the fourteenth century the remedy
of attachment was exclusively a punishment for contempt of court. Where an
order or writ of the court had been disobeyed or an irregularity or contempt
committed by an officer of the court a writ of attachment would issue. By virtue
of this writ the sheriff would seize the offender and he would be jailed pending
payment of whatever fine the court felt was justified.'
At early common law the attachment of property was a coercive device em-
ployed by the courts of common pleas to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant.
The attachment of his possessions compelled his appearance since if he chose to
remain outside the court's jurisdiction or would not furnish sureties for his
appearance the seized property was forfeited.2
The contemporary concept of attachment, seizing in advance of judgment the
property of a debtor as security for a debt, was unknown at common law. Its
origin was rather in the civil law and arose from a custom of the London mer-
chants whereby a creditor was enabled to reach debts of an absent debtor, even
though the debtor himself was not available for personal service. This custom
was recognized and enforced by the courts and gradually became incorporated
into the common law where it was styled "foreign attachment." 3
As developed in New York practice, attachment is a provisional remedy
available only to a limited class of plaintiffs4 and then only in certain actions.3
1. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 391-92 (3d ed. 1927).
2. 2 Pollock and Mfaifland, History of English Law 593 (2d ed. 1923).
3. Kneeland, Attachments 14-16.
4. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 903 requires that a plaintiff, in order to be entitled to a warrant
of attachment must show that defendant is: (1) a foreign corporation or a non-re-ident of
the state; or (2) if a resident, that he has departed from the state with intent to defraud
his creditors, avoid service of a summons, or is hiding in the state with like intent; or (3) if
a natural person or a domestic corporation, has removed or is about to remove property
from the state to defraud creditors, or has assigned or is about to assign property with lihe
intent, or if a domestic corporation and no person can be found upon whom to serve a
summons; or (4) has secured credit by a written false financial statement; or (5) if a
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It exists purely by statute, and the courts have consistently strictly construed
its provisions against the party seeking to utilize them.0 The main purpose of
an attachment proceeding is to provide a plaintiff with security. Through it, a
debtor's property can be seized by the sheriff and held in custodia legis pending
the outcome of the action. When the judgment is entered the attached property
is either returned to a successful debtor or applied to the creditor's judgment.
Because its literal effect runs contrary to the common law principle of not
seizing a debtor's property before adjudication, its use is carefully circumscribed
and the penalties for its misapplication strict.7 The second and extremely
important purpose of an attachment proceeding is to gain jurisdiction over a
foreign debtor's property located within the state, thereby enabling the plaintiff
to maintain an action.8
Over the years the interpretation of the New York attachment statutes by the
courts severely limited many of their provisions, eliciting the comment in 1940
from one advocate of clarification, "in some cases 'complete befuddlement' has
resulted from them [the attachment statutes] even after their subjection to
judicial analysis." The following year radical changes were made in the attach-
ment articles; these took into effect the decided cases and greatly simplified
procedures. 10 However clear the wording now is, the interpretation has con-
tinued, as evidenced by the instant case.
One well-settled principle of New York attachment law is that property-
interests, substantially contingent in character are not attachable." This concept
resident, has been out of the state continuously for six months and has not designated a
person on whom a summons may be served.
5. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 902 restricts actions under which an attachment of defendant's
property may be had to those to recover a sum of money only because of breach of contract,
wrongful conversion of personal property, injury to person or property due to negligence,
fraud, or other wrongful act, or in an action by an executor or administrator for wrongful
death.
6. Penoyer v. Kelsey, 150 N.Y. 77, 44 N.E. 788 (1896); 37-01 31st St. Corp. v. Young,
200 Misc. 501, 106 N.Y.S. 2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Nowikos (London), Ltd. v. Petrousis,
186 Misc. 710, 60 N.Y.S. 2d 802 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Nolan v. Louis Workman Co., 146 Misc.
99, 261 N.Y. Supp. 534 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
7. In general, before a warrant of attachment will be granted security must be given
by the creditor seeking the warrant. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 819. Exceptions to the require-
ment of security are statutory and exist almost exclusively where the plaintiff creditor is the
state or a political subdivision thereof. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 162 and 908. A failure
by the plaintiff to secure judgment or a vacating of the warrant will normally subject him
to liability on the undertaking for damages and costs. In addition the successful debtor or
a third party having title to the attached property may bring an action for wrongful attach-
ment on the theory of trespass or conversion.
8. United States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E. 2d 64 (1945).
9. Finn, The Streamlining of Attachment Procedure, 9 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 36 (1940).
10. The legislature in 1941 adopted the recommendations of the Judicial Council of the
State of New York, such revisions effective Sept. 1, 1941. See The Judicial Council, Seventh
Annual Report and Studies 455-77 (1940).
11. Sheehy v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 266 N.Y. 44, 193 N.E. 633 (1934); Herman
and Grace v. City of New York, 130 App. Div. 531, 114 N.Y. Supp. 1107 (1st Dep't 1909),
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is in line with the broader principle that the attachment of a debtor's property
should give the attaching creditor no greater right in it than the debtor had
himself. 2 Analogously, an attachment lien does not displace the equities or
rights to which the attached property was subject in the hands of the debtor 23
The attaching creditor, in a word, does not occupy the legally exalted position
of a bona fide purchaser for value.14
To be subject to attachment, the property seized, in a suitable action, must
be property of the defendant. 1' In the present case plaintiff attached a cause
of action which defendant corporation was pursuing against X corporation.
Though a cause of action is intangible and not property in the ordinary sense,
the statutes specifically recognize it as an attachable interest, provided it arises
under or on account of a contract. 16 Here, though, the plaintiff went further and
sought to enjoin the disposition of an attached fund held under defendant's levy
of attachment as security for the outcome of defendant's action against X
corporation.
The plaintiff relied on the argument that the attached fund was a part of
defendant's cause of action and therefore was within his reach under the Civil
Practice Act, i.e., "the levy of attachment thereupon is deemed a levy upon, and
a seizure and attachment of all the rights of the defendant in and to such cause
of action." 17 The court rejected this argument as it did a reference to a Court
of Appeals' dictum' s to the effect that ". . . a lien [attachment] is property in
the broad sense of that word and although it has no physical existence it exists
by operation of law so effectively as to have pecuniary value, and to be capable
of being bought and sold."19
Though intangible interests subject to becoming completely valueless, e.g., a
cause of action, are attachable,2 contingent interests decidedly are not. In the
instant case the court properly held that defendant's interest in the fund levied
upon was a contingent one since any number of happenings might occur to
preclude a judgment in the defendant's favor and the consequent perfection of
the attachment lien. Therefore, the court would not allow plaintiff's attachment
of defendant's cause of action to reach the security fund and thereby violate
the basic principle that the attaching creditor could not, by levying attachment,
gain more rights in the attached property than those possessed by the debtor.
affd on opinion below, 199 N.Y. 600, 93 N.E. 376 (1910); Fredrick v. Chicago B]ring
Metal Co., 221 App. Div. 58S, 224 N.Y. Supp. 629 (1st Dep't 1927).
12. McLaughlin v. Swain, 18 U.S. (How.) 217 (1S55).
13. Generally, where an attachment lien is levied after another lien exists on the property
it is subordinate. See People v. St. Nicholas Bank, 44 App. Div. 313, 60 N.Y. Supp. 719
(1st Dep't 1S99); Brooksville Granite Co. v. Latty, 83 MIsc. 3S4, 144 N.Y. Supp. 1042
(Sup. Ct. 1913).
14. Westevelt v. Hagge, 61 Neb. 647, 85 N.W. 852 (1901).
15. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act §§ 902, 904, 910, 912, 913.
16. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 916(4).
17. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
18. Haebler v. Myers, 132 N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963 (1S92).
19. Id. at 368, 30 N.E. at 965.
20. See note 6 supra.
1956] CASE NOTES
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
For the purpose of argument, even conceding that the fund might be reached
by plaintiff's levy of attachment, the fund would still be subject to the rights
and equities existing before the attachment. Thus X corporation and defend-
ant's right to abate the action or relinquish security under it, as they saw fit,
were rights prior to plaintiff's levy. In addition, the Court of Appeals' dictum
condoning a broad interpretation of what constituted property was deemed inap-
plicable since there the facts were at wide variance with those of the present
case.
In denying plaintiff the right to interfere with the fund's disposition the court
did not thereby compromise plaintiff's rights. If a fraud existed in the dealings
between X corporation and defendant relative to the release of the fund so as
to compromise plaintiff's claim, plenary actions could be pursued by the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff's avenue of approach to the desired end was ill chosen how-
ever meritorious the cause. The courts being bound to a strict interpretation of
the statutes will not tolerate the interposition of a provisional remedy to displace
the prior rights and equities of others.
Conflict of Laws-Application of Section 167(3) of the New York Insur-
ance Law to a New York Insurance Liability Policy where the Tort Oc-
curs in a Foreign Jurisdiction.-Defendants, H (husband) and W (wife),
were residents of New York where W had obtained an automobile liability
insurance policy from plaintiff insurance company. While driving in Con-
necticut W negligently injured H, a passenger in the car. H initiated an action
against W in Connecticut and plaintiff insurance company brought this action
in New York for a declaratory judgment declaring that plaintiff was not
liable to the defendants on the insurance policy and was not required to defend
the Connecticut suit. Held, declaratory judgment denied. Section 167(3) of
the New York Insurance Law does not apply to a New York insurance policy
where the cause of action arises in a foreign jurisdiction. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Stecker, 208 Misc. 858, 145 N.Y.S. 2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
At common law in New York neither spouse could sue the other for personal
injury.1 In 1937 the legislature amended section 57 of the Domestic Relations
Law terminating this disability. At the same time the legislature enacted section
167(3) of the Insurance Law. It provides that a personal injury liability policy
does not render the insurance carrier liable to the insured where the liability
arose out of a suit by the insured's spouse, unless the policy expressly includes
such coverage. Since there was no such express provision in the policy in the
principal case, plaintiff insurance company would have been entitled to the
declaratory judgment had the court found section 167(3) applicable. The
court suggested three grounds for ruling the section inapplicable.
For one, the court reasoned that "... the law of the place where the tort or
wrong is committed controls and the rights and liabilities arising out of an
automobile accident are governed by the law of the state in which the accident
1. Allen v. Allen, 246 N.Y. 571, 159 N.E. 656 (1927).
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occurs, regardless of where the insurance policy was issued."- If from this it
was intended to conclude that the law of the place where the tort occurs will
determine the liability under an insurance policy contracted in another state,
the court's position may be criticized. The doctrine of lex loci delecti can be
directed only at determining the liability of the tortfeasor to the injured party,
which, in the principal case, means the liability of W to H. The liability of
the insurance company is founded upon the contract of insurance. This vital
distinction was not lost by the New York Supreme Court in Bradford v. Utica
Mutual Insurance Co.3 In that case H was insured by an insurance company in
Massachusetts. While driving in New York as a passenger, he negligently
caused W's death. Massachusetts, with the majority of American jurisdictions,4
does not allow such a suit between spouses. The New York court stated that
New York law determined the liability between H and W, but it also ruled
that section 167(3) was not applicable to the contract of insurance since it was
to be interpreted according to the law of Massachusetts where it was made.
This distinction has also been noted and applied by the Connecticut courts5
and other jurisdictions.6
It would be presumptuous, however, to conclude that the court's reference
to the len loci delecti in the instant case was a disavowal of the Bradford
case. New York is here the place of contracting as well as the forum; a New
York court is being asked to construe a contract made in New York. The
court was obviously aware of the contractual aspects of the case for it turned
to section 358 of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws as another
basis of its decision, relying upon that part of the section which says that "the
duty for the performance of which a party to a contract is bound will be dis-
charged by compliance with the law of the place of performance of the promise
with respect to: ... (c) the person or persons by whom or to whom performance
shall be made or rendered .... 'IT Assuming the soundness of this rule it does
not follow, however, that its application was appropriate here so as to permit
Connecticut law to determine whether or not the insurance company must per-
form. The Restatement rule itself presumes that there already exists a ,....
duty for the performance of which a party to a contract is bound ... .s The
real question in controversy was whether or not the insurance company was
bound by the contract to perform at all; this is a problem relating to the
interpretation of the contract rather than of its performance. The comment
supplementing the rules of the Restatement clearly indicates9 that the acts
2. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Stecker, 203 Mizc. 353, S61, 145 N.Y.S. 2d 143, 151
(Sup. Ct. 1955).
3. 179 Misc. 919, 39 N.Y.. 2d 810 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
4. See cases cited 43 A.L.R. 2d 632 (1955).
5. Levy v. Daniel's U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 103 Conn. 333, 143 At. 163 (1928).
6. Boisvert v. Boisvert, 94 N.H. 357, .53 A. 2d 515 (1947); Farrell v. Employer's Lia-
bility Assur. Corp., 54 RI. 18, 168 At. 911 (1933).
7. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 358 (1934). (Emphasis as supplied by the court.)
8. Ibid.
9. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 358 (1934), comment (a), which states in part
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which a party is bound to perform are determined by the law of the place of
contracting whereas it is the form and manner of performing that are to be
determined by the law of the place of performance. 10
Until recently, New York seemed to adopt the Restatement rule with its
attendant comment. It was "well settled"" that ". . . all matters bearing upon
the execution, the interpretation and the validity of contracts... are determined
by the law of the place where the contract is made .... All matters connected
with its performance, including presentation, notice, demand, etc., are regulated
by the law of the place where the contract, by its terms, is to be performed.12
However, the recent Court of Appeals decision in Auten v. Auten la suggests a
"center of gravity rule" under which the law of the place most intimately con-
cerned with the legal relations arising out of the contract may be applied-
presumably as to all matters. It would be difficult to forecast how the courts
would apply the rule to the principal case.14
As a third basis of its decision the court cited a recent Connecticut decision,1
which, under the identical facts of the principal case, rejected the applicability
of section 167(3). The court there reasoned that the New York Legislature,
in passing simultaneously section 57 of the Domestic Relations Law and section
167(3) of the Insurance Law, intended that the latter ". . . relate only to the
newly created right of action, which was necessarily based on occurrences within
the state of New York."'16 The Connecticut court cited a New York court's
statement that these contemporaneous enactments manifested a "... considered
legislative intent to create a right of action theretofore denied, and at the
same time to protect insurance carriers against loss through collusive actions
between husband and wife."' 7 It would appear that wherever section 57 creates
that "... after the language of the contract is made clear by interpretation and the duty
imposed by the law of the place of contracting is ascertained, there may still remain
problems connected with the details of performance of such duty .... The law of the place
of performance determines the manner and method as well as the legality of . . . per-
formance. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) See note 10 infra.
10. "Thus, whether a duty of performance is to be conditional, and when, where
and by whom the performance is to be made and exactly what act of performance a party
is obliged by the contract to do are determined by the law of the place of contracting.
However, certain questions pertaining to the form and manner of performance are governed
by the law of the place of performance ... " Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 346,
comment (a) (1934).
11. Duval v. Skouras, 181 Misc. 651, 653, 44 N.Y.S. 2d 107, 109 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
12. Union National Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 543, 62 N.E. 672, 673 (1902).
13. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1955), 24 Fordham L. Rev. 268.
14. In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E. 2d 99 (1955), the Court of Appeals
put considerable stress upon the place of residence of the parties and upon the place where
the contract (separation agreement) was to be performed.
15. Williamson v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., 142 Conn. 573, 116 A. 2d
169 (1955).
16. Id. at 576, 116 A. 2d at 172.
17. Fuchs v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., 258 App. Div. 603, 605, 17 N.Y.S.
2d 338, 340 (2d Dep't 1940), 9 Fordham L. Rev. 288. Section 57 of the Domestic Relations
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a new cause of action, then and then only will section 167(3) apply. The ap-
plication of this argument must depend upon what new causes of action were
created by the enactment of section 57. Analysis presents four situations.18
The first, and simplest, is where the tort occurs in New York and the action
is brought in New York. Since the cause of action in such a case would depend
upon section 57, section 167(3) may be interpreted to apply. The second situa-
tion is where the tort occurs in New York but the action is brought in a foreignjurisdiction. Here again, since the liability is determined by the law of the
place where the tort occurs, the cause of action could only be sustained by sec-
tion 57, and section 167 would apply. The third situation is where the tort oc-
curs in a foreign jurisdiction but the action is brought in New York. Prior to the
enactment of section 57, New York, on grounds of public policy, would not have
entertained a personal injury action between spouses where the tort occurred
in a foreign jurisdiction, even though the law of that jurisdiction allowed such
a suit.19 This prohibition ended with the passage of section 57 and so again
167(3) may be interpreted as applicable.20 The fourth situation is where the
tort occurs in a foreign jurisdiction and the action is brought in that foreign
jurisdiction. Clearly in such a case the cause of action would not depend upon
section 57 and so section 167(3) would not be applicable to the insurance policy.
The situation presented by the instant case falls into this last category.2
Granting that section 167(3) is coextensive with section 57 the court properly
precluded the operation of the New York insurance statute on the foreign cause
of action.
Contracts-Exclusive Jurisdiction Provision in Bill of Lading Held Valid.
-A New York corporation was the consignee of a shipment of cocoa beans
which was being transported by sea from Sweden to Philadelphia aboard
a Swedish vessel. The ship and its cargo were lost at sea, whereupon the co-
signee filed a libel in admiralty in the United States District Court against the
shipping line to recover for the loss of cargo. The District Court granted the
Law, section 167(3) of the Insurance Law and section 59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law
were passed simultaneously and were conceived from the same legiElative frame of mind.
Section 59 was later held by the New York courts to be applicable only to a tort occurring
in New York. Cherwien v. Geiter, 272 N.Y. 165, 5 N.E. 2d 185 (1936).
1S. In each of these four examples it is assumed that the contract of insurance was made
in New York since otherwise the issue of whether section 167(3) is applicable is not
pertinent.
19. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. 2d 597 (1936).
20. This conclusion is in contradiction to the Connecticut court's statement in William-
son v. Massachusetts Bonding and Insurance Co., see note 16 supra, that the newly created
right of action is "... necessarily based on occurrences within . . . New York.
21. The principal case was an action brought in New York, but it was an action for
a declaratory judgment to decide what effect section 167(3) has upon a contract of
insurance where the tort occurs in Connecticut and the action on the tort is brought in
Connecticut.
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carrier's motion to decline jurisdiction and dismissed the libel on the ground
that effect should be given to the clause in the bill of lading providing for
exclusive jurisdiction of the controversy in the Swedish courts. On appeal, held,
affirmed. The reasonableness of the agreement conferring jurisdiction on the
courts of the carrier's country properly justifies the court in declining to exercise
its jurisdiction. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, 224 F. 2d 806 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
It is a generally accepted rule in the United States that an express provision
in a contract which limits the jurisdiction of a controversy arising thereunder
to a specific court, will not be enforced in another court where jurisdiction other-
wise attaches.1 Most decisions in this country have declared such contracts to
be invalid and against public policy, 2 reasoning primarily that such agreements
oust the courts of their proper jurisdiction and secondly, that matters of remedy,
being created and regulated by law, are not subject to alteration by agreement
of the parties prior to a breach of the contract. The rule has been applied with
equal certainty in cases where the provision was intended to limit jurisdiction to
a foreign country,3 or to a state,4 county5 or city0 of the United States, or to
exclude the state courts in favor of the federal courts7 and vice versa.8 State
statutes providing for exclusive jurisdiction agreements by foreign corporations
operating therein, to limit disputes to the state, have been held unconstitutional.0
Except for two early Massachusetts cases, exclusive jurisdiction contracts
have found little popularity in the United States. 10 Nevertheless, dissatisfaction
1. 6 Williston, Contracts § 1725 (rev. ed. 1938); 1 Benedict, Admiralty § 22a (6th ed.
1940); Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 270 (2d ed. 1951).
2. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445 (1874); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Cia.
Colonial De Navegacao, 121 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. N.Y. 1954); Kuhnhold v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 251 Fed. 387 (S.D. N.Y. 1918); Nashua River Paper Co. v.
Flammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377
(1868); Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174 (1856); Parker v. Krauss Co.,
157 Misc. 667, 284 N.Y. Supp. 478 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1935), aff'd, 249 App. Div. 718, 292
N.Y. Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1936). See note, 59 A.L.R. 1445 (1929); 25 Colum. L. Rev.
1063 (1925); Syke, Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on Foreign
Courts, 10 La. L. Rev. 293 (1950).
3. Slocum v. Western Assur. Co., 42 F. 235 (S.D. N.Y. 1890).
4. Parker v. Krauss Co., 157 Misc. 667, 284 N.Y. Supp. 478 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1935),
aff'd, 249 App. Div. 718, 292 N.Y. Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1936).
5. Amesbury v. Bowditch Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 596 (1856).
6. General Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson, 207 Cal. 285, 277 Pac. 1039 (1929).
7. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 Fed. 508 (6th Cir.
1897).
8. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445 (1874).
9. Insurance Co. v. Morse, supra note 8; Bish v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp.,
102 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. La. 1952).
10. Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903); Daley v. People's Build-
ing, Loan and Savings Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N.E. 452 (1901). Both cases were sub-
sequently limited to their facts by the Massachusetts court in Nashua River Paper Co. v.
Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916).
with the general rule has grown in recent years, 1 and several modem decisions 2
indicate at least a tendency for relaxation of the denunciatory rule, if not a
definite preference for the minority view.' 3 In England contracts conferring
exclusive jurisdiction to a specific court have long been recognized as valid14
and since the English Arbitration Act of 1889, based on the analogy between
such contracts and agreements to submit disputes for arbitration to a specific
group or tribunal, have been enforced as agreements to arbitrate.15 The analogy
was early evident in this country; both agreements were traditionally classed
together and adjudged void as against public policy.10 However, the widespread
adoption of local and federal arbitration statutes in this country caused a change
of position as to arbitration agreements and it has been suggested that the
same result might follow with contracts conferring e-xclusive jurisdiction upon
a specific court.'
7
Adopting a modification of the minority position, the court in the present
case stated that, ". . the parties by agreement cannot oust a court of jurisdic-
tion otherwise obtaining .... But if... the court finds that the agreement is
not unreasonable in the setting of the particular case, it may properly decline
jurisdiction and relegate a litigant to the forum to which he assented."' 9 This
11. Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F. 2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949); United States
Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1006 (S.D. N.Y. 1915); Parker v.
Krauss Co., 157 Misc. 667, 673, 2S4 N.Y. Supp. 47S, 4S4 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1935) (dissent);
Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y. Supp. 10 (Sup. CL 1925). See
also, Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts
in Matters of Admiralty, 35 Cornell L.Q. 36, n. 103 (1949).
12. Cerro De Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, 137 F. 2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951);
United States Merchants' & Shippers' Ins. Co. v. A/S Den Norske AfriLka Og Australia Line,
65 F. 2d 392 (2d Cir. 1933); Sociedade Brasileira v. SS. Punta Del Este 135 F. Supp. 394
(D.C. N.J. 1955) (jurisdiction declined on other grounds). See also, Galban Lobo Trading
Co. v. The Diponegoro, 103 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
13. " .. I do not believe that, today at least there is an absolute taboo against such
contracts .... they are invalid only when unreasonable .... What remains of the doctrine
is apparently no more than a general hostility, which can be overcome. . . " Krenger v.
Pennsylvania R. Co, 174 F. 2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949) (concurring opinion).
14. Scott v. Avery. 5 H. 811, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856); Law v. Garret, 8 Ch.
D. 26 (CA. 18178).
15. Austrian Lloyd Steamship Co. v. Gresham Life Assur. Soc'y, [1903] 1 K.B. 249;
Kirchner & Co. v. Gruban, [1909J 1 Ch. 413, 416; The Cap Blanco, [1913] P. Div. 130.
See United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co, 222 Fed. 10
(S.D. N.Y. 1915); 45 Yale LJ. 1150 (1936). For an American case treating an agreement
to submit to a specific court as an agreement to submit to arbitration, see Kelvin Engineer-
ing Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y. Supp. 10 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
16. American Sugar Refining Co. v. The Anaconda, 138 F. 2d 765 (Sth Cir. 1943);
United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. 1005 (S.D.
N.Y. 1915); Williams v. Branning Mfg. Co., 154 N.C. 205, 70 S.E. 290 (1911); Sutro v.
Balk, Inc., 151 N.Y. Supp. 764 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1915). See 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1433
(1951); 45 Yale LJ. 1150 (1936).
17. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws 276 (2d ed. 1951).
18. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line, 224 F. 2d 006, S03 (2d Cir.) crt, denied,
350 U.S. 903 (1955). In addition, the court very properly refused to rule that § 1303(8)
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does not go so far as to say the agreements are necessarily enforceable if
reasonable, but only that the court may decline jurisdiction, wisely leaving an
area of discretion in applying the rule. This is a salutary departure from an
inflexible and, as such, outmoded rule. The effect is to allow the exclusive
jurisdiction contract recognition where its application would achieve a just
result.
Although not noted by the Circuit Court, it is significant that the District
Court in the instant case' 9 felt that since it found the agreement valid, it was
not required to reach the question of forum non conveniens but that if it had,
it would have come to the same conclusion based on the same facts which the
Circuit Court considered in determining whether the agreement was reasonable,
viz., that the ship was Swedish owned and built and that all the crew members
resided there. Although it seems that the question of reasonableness will pre-
clude consideration of forum non conveniens, the test of reasonableness under
this decision includes the same factors and the result will often be the same.
Considering another factor of which the court did not take cognizance, several
cases have stated that although an American has no absolute right to be heard
in an American court,20 a court may not decline jurisdiction unless injustice
would result.2 1 These cases have been quite explicit in stating that mere in-
convenience to the non-citizen is not ground for refusing to accept jurisdiction.
Since inconvenience of the non-citizen under the present decision was a factor
in ascertaining the reasonableness of agreements to submit to a foreign jurisdic-
tion, by implication the broad rule favoring the acceptance of a cause is nar-
rowed to the point that if an agreement to submit exists, inconvenience of the
non-citizen may constitute grounds for declining jurisdiction.22
Certain practical justifications exist for allowing parties to select in advance
the jurisdiction to which they will submit. Thus it may be arranged in advance
that the contract will be interpreted by the courts of the country or state under
whose laws it was written, that inconveniences, which may easily arise through
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1300-15, which provides that an
agreement lessening the carrier's liability is null and void, could be construed in such a
way that an agreement limiting venue to a specific jurisdiction was a lessening of liability
under it, as the courts have construed a somewhat similar provision in the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 55. The FELA has been so construed in the light of
a strong congressional intent to favor plaintiffs, no such intent being present in the enact-
ment of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. See Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R., 338
U.S. 263 (1949), 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 413 (1950).
19. Appendix to Brief for Appellant, p. 16, Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line,
224 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
20. The possibility of the existence of an absolute right has been suggested in a number
of opinions but the question is ordinarily left open. See Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania
Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 697 (1950).
21. Wheeler v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 108 F. Supp. 652
(S.D. N.Y. 1952); The Saudades, 67 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
22. It is of some interest to note that appellant's brief indicates that more than 53 other
American cargo consignees were awaiting the outcome of this appeal to determine if all were
to be relegated to the courts of Sweden.
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the devices available in securing jurisdiction, e.g., service on an agent and
foreign attachment, will be avoided. Further it is urged that the risk of a bad
bargain being present in every contract, there is no reason why the parties
should not be held to such an agreement.2 3 The argument that matters of
remedy are not subject to change by agreement of the parties has little validity
when one considers that a party may waive the statute of limitations, contract to
limit the amount of damages recoverable with a liquidation clause, barter away
in advance the right to a jury trial, or to an appeal, and that parties may settle
their dispute out of court or neglect to pursue an existing suit.
The arguments against enforcing such agreements in admiralty bills of lading
are equally cogent. A lack of equality in bargaining power does existi 4 a factor
which our courts always consider in determining the validity of contracts. Such
contracts are consensual in name only since the steamship companies make
the agreements and the individual shipper has little opportunity to repudiate
the document agreed upon by the trade if he desires to have his goods shipped.
Many American shippers will be relegated to foreign courts by enforcement of
such agreements over which they have little control and, in situations where a
small claim exists, the expense of litigating in a foreign court is prohibitive and
would probably result in abandonment of such a claim.
Application of the strict rule prohibiting the enforcement of agreements
specifying exclusive jurisdiction would in any number of situations fail to
achieve a just result. For this reason it is submitted that the instant decision
is sound in recognizing the need for discretionary powers in reviewing each
such agreement on its own merits. It is further submitted, however, that on the
facts of this case, specifically the non-mutuality of the so-called contract, the
court in applying this rule of latitude might well have reached an opposite
conclusion.
Corporations-Derivative Action-Liability of Controlling Stockholders
for Profits from Sale of Stock.--Defendant corporation's minority stock-
holders brought a derivative action demanding an accounting for profits realized
by defendants as a result of selling a corporate asset through the sale of con-
trolling stock. The alleged asset was the ability to control the allocation of
the corporate product in a time of short supply. Plaintiffs charged that de-
fendant, who was dominant stockholder, chairman of the board of directors,
and president of the corporation, breached his fiduciary duty to the corpora-
tion. The holding in the District Court concluded that the defendants were
not liable. On appeal, held, one judge dissenting, reversed. Defendant was ac-
countable to minority stockholders to the extent that the price paid represented
payment for right to control distribution. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F. 2d 173
(2d Cir. 1955).
Shares of stock in a corporation are the private property of the owner.
A shareholder is therefore, permitted to sell his stocks at the best price obtain-
23. See 45 Yale LJ. 1150 (1936); 25 Colum. L.R. 1053 (1925).
24. United States v. Farr Sugar Corp., 191 F. 2d 370, 374 (2d Cir. 1951).
1956]
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
able and to whomever he may choose to sell.' Owners of a controlling block
of stock have been permitted to demand a higher premium for their sale2
In view of the fiduciary relationship existing between majority shareholders
and minority shareholders, 3 however, a duty is imposed upon the former to act
in good faith and with due care in the transfer of their stock.4 Generally, the
cases involving the breach of the fiduciary relationship by corporate officers
have been decided on two theories.5 Under the first, the so-called "looting
theory," a majority stockholder is held liable for the damage done to the cor-
poration by those to whom he sold his controlling interest if he could have
reasonably foreseen that these purchasers were not in good faith and would
subsequently plunder the corporation. 6 Under the other, termed the "corporate
opportunity theory," the majority shareholder is held responsible to the corpora-
tion if he should realize, through the sale of his stock, the value of an asset
rightfully belonging to the corporation which is not attributable to his interest.7
Primarily this type situation exists where a director-majority shareholder votes
to reject a bid made to the corporation to purchase stock and then sells his own
controlling shares for a higher premium. There he would certainly be intercept-
ing an "opportunity" rightfully belonging to the corporation for his personal
advantage.
The majority in the present decision, apparently proceeding on the corporate
opportunity theory, found that the defendant director-shareholder aggrandized
his personal gain by selling an advantage ascribable to the corporation. 8 Noting
that the advantage-here the ability to allocate the corporate product-need
merely be a possible source of corporate increase in order to support an action,
the court placed upon the defendants the burden of negativing such possible
gain by the corporation. Furthermore, while admitting the right of a dominant
1. Jacob v. Reynaud, 152 La. 353, 93 So. 121 (1922); Roosevelt v. Hamblin, 199 Mass.
127, 85 N.E. 98 (1908).
2. Gallagher v. Pacific American Co., 97 F. 2d 193 (9th Cir. 1938); Stanton v. Schenek,
140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
3. Equity Corp. v. Groves, 294 N.Y. 8, 60 N.E. 2d 19 (1945); Pink v. Title Guarantee
& Trust Co., 274 N.Y. 167, 8 N.E. 2d 321 (1937); Welt v. The Beachcomber, Inc., 166
Misc. 29, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1937), where the court said that officers, directors and
majority stockholders are in a fiduciary relationship with minority stockholders.
4. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (ED. Pa. 1940).
5. Comment, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 895 (1955); Note, 40 Corn. L.Q. 786 (1955); 68
Harv. L. Rev. 1274 (1955).
6. Insuranshares Corp. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940). See
also Gerdes v. Reynolds, 262 App. Div. 944, 29 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
7. Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Ati. 77 (1910).
8. The asset alleged to have been sold was the ability to allocate steel during this period
of short supply. Allocation was important to the corporation because of its business practice
of securing interest-free loans from prospective purchasers in exchange for firm commit-
ments on future delivery. Thus the corporation was actually receiving a higher market
price for its product and was using these profits to rebuild its antiquated facilities. The
purchasing syndicate, after gaining control of the corporation allocated all the remaining
steel to itself at the current market price. Hence, the corporation was deprived of the higher
premium attained through the interest-free loans.
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stockholder to dispose of his controlling block of stock without having to
account to his corporation, the court held that where the corporation's product
is bringing an unusually large premium, the fiduciary may not appropriate to
himself the value of this premium. The majority also felt that since a recovery
by the corporation would result in gain to the purchasing syndicate, its benefits
should entire to the plaintiffs individually and not to the corporation.
Extending the corporate opportunity theory by applying it to the facts of
this case, would seem to be a liberalization of the rule not previously indulged
in by the courts. The question to be answered before this doctrine should apply
is whether or not the sale of the ability to allocate the corporate product con-
stituted a sale of an interest which belonged solely to the corporation. Direction
of the distribution of the corporate product would seem to be an inseparable
ingredient of control and necessarily included in any sale of a controlling
interest. If the defendants had turned down a proposal by the purchasing
syndicate which would have been beneficial to the corporation in order that
they might later sell their controlling stock at a premium there would be basis
for valid application of the corporate opportunity doctrine.10
Reliance upon the corporate opportunity theory also poses a problem in
damages. Since the defendant, as controlling stockholder, would be permitted
to demand a higher price for his controlling block than the corporation's stock
was bringing on the market,11 the actual value of defendant's stock would have
to be first determined and then subtracted from the total amount which de-
fendant received for his stock. The remainder would be the value of the cor-
porate asset which the defendant "wrongfully" sold. The court avoided this
difficult computation by placing the burden upon the defendant, as a fiduciary,
of proving that his controlling block of stock was actually worth the sale price
and, therefore, that none of his profit resulted from sale of a corporate asset -12
Under the looting theory the question of damages is considerably simplified,
viz., the actual damage to the corporation rather than the difficult-to-ascertain
value of a doubtful corporate opportunity. However, the trial court in the
present case, found no bad faith on the part of the defendant in the sale to
the syndicate-purchaser and that these purchasers consisted, not of looters,
but of businessmen who were seeking to take advantage of an opportunity to
procure more steel at a time of tight supply. For this reason the looting ap-
proach ought to be excluded as the basis for the decision.
Although the language of the majority opinion is vague and it is difficult to
determine upon what theory this opinion was decided, the verdict does not seem
to be inequitable. There is evidence to the effect that the principal defendant
9. Individual recovery would seem improper in this case since it is the plaintiffs conten-
tion that the defendant breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation by zelling an aset
belonging to the corporation. If, then, it is the corporation that is injured by this breach
of fiduciary duty, it is the corporation which should recover the damages.
10. See Commonwealth Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 At. 77 (1910).
11. Cases cited note 2 supra.
12. The dissenting opinion and the trial court held that the price was not unreasonab!a
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included in the sale an agreement to turn over control of the board of directors,'3
and while a bona fide sale of stock may incidently pass corporate control, the
corporation's offices may not be directly sold; 14 nor may they be included for a
consideration in the sale of a controlling block of stock.1 Adding weight to the
court's decision were the facts that the defendant not only received a high price
for his stock but also knew or should have known that as a result of the sale
the purchaser would not pay the premium that the corporation had been receiv-
ing for its product. On these grounds the decision is justified.
Corporations - Triple Derivative Suit Allowed in Absence of Controlling
Interest.-Plaintiff, a stockholder in A corporation, brought a derivative suit in
the name of X corporation against its directors alleging misuse of corporate
funds. At the time of the alleged injury the plaintiff owned a small percentage
of the common stock of A corporation and A corporation held a controlling per-
centage of the stock of X corporation. The plaintiff held none of X's stock
directly. Before the suit was instituted A transferred all of its stock in X to B.
A received in exchange a minority interest in B, but B became the parent in
control of both A and X. The plaintiff owned no stock in B. He alleged that all
three of the corporations were controlled by one of the individual defendants.
X corporation moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff
at the time he instituted the action was neither a stockholder in X nor in any
corporation which was a stockholder in X. Held, motion dismissed. The plaintiff
has sufficient interest to bring a triple derivative suit, the benefit of which would
redound to him through the parent corporation and the subsidiary in which he
owned stock. Kaufman v. Wolfson, 132 F. Supp. 733 (1955).
In a derivative action the plaintiff is a mere instigator. The cause of action is
that of the corporation and the recovery must run in its favor.' Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 and under the New York General Corporation
Law,3 in order to prosecute a simple derivative suit, the complainant must have
13. ". . ., I will deliver to you, at the time you exercise the option, [to purchase my
shares of stock] the resignation of all of the members of the Board of Directors of the...
Corpn." Perlman v. Feldmann, 129 F. Supp. 162, 172 (D. Conn. 1952).
14. Moulton v. Field, 179 Fed. 673 (7th Cir. 1910); Fennessy v. Ross, 5 App. Div. 342,
39 N.Y. Supp. 323 (1st Dep't, 1896).
15. Mount v. Seagrave Corp., 112 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Ohio 1953); McClure v. Law, 161
N.Y. 78, 55 N.E. 388 (1899).
1. Holmes v. Camp, 180 App. Div. 409, 167 N.Y. Supp. 840 (1st Dep't 1917).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) which states: "In an action brought to enforce a secondary right
on the part of one or more shareholders ...the complaint shall be verified by oath and
shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he
complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. . . .The
complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from
the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he
desires, and the reasons for this failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making
such effort."
3. N.Y. General Corporation Law § 61 which is patterned on and substantially the same
as Rule 23 (b), Fed. R. Civ. P., supra note 2.
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been a stockholder in the corporation at the time of the alleged wrong. Case law
has added another requirement, namely, that he be a stockholder in the corpora-
tion at the time he instituted suit. 4 The same requirements apply to multiple
derivative suits, the setting for which generally permits a stockholder in a parent
corporation to maintain an action for the benefit and in behalf of a subsidiary
company.5 In the multiple derivative suits, however, the decisions have sug-
gested another requisite, viz., that the parent corporation, in which the com-
plainant owns stock, have a controlling interest in the subsidiary.(
There is some question, however, concerning the ultimate basis for this control
requirement and its position in multiple derivative suits. In United States Lines
Co. v. United States Lines Inc.,7 the Second Circuit said that "the justification
for allowing a double derivative suit . . . is that both the original corporation
that is said to have suffered the wrong and its shareholder corporation which had
the right to bring a derivative suit were in the control of those charged with in-
flicting the corporate injury."8 Significantly, the courts have refrained from
designating this control as either a substantive or a formal element of the cause
of action, nor have they specified the time at which it must exist (i.e., whether
at the time of the injury or at the time of the action or at both).
Various theories have been advanced to justify the multiple derivative suit.
To ascertain the validity of each, and to find what part "control" plays in such
an action, it is necessary to look at the possible intercorporate structures which
could give rise to such suits. The first of these possible arrangements involves a
situation where the parent wholly owns the subsidiary. This situation is worthy
of note only as the historical basis of a theory once advanced as justification of
the multiple derivative suit, namely, that multiple derivatives were allowed solely
on the basis that if plaintiff were unable to sue, no one could, since the wrong-
doers would not allow the corporations to sue; and the wrong would go unre-
quited.9 This reasoning is obviously weak; for in simple derivative suits other
stockholders may be able to enforce the corporate right. In fact this theory is
waylaid by those courts which have allowed suit where the subsidiary was not
wholly owned. 0
A possible alternative would be that the parent corporation simply control the
4. MlacVeagh v. Denver City Water Works- 107 Fed. 17 (Sth Cir. 1901); Hanna v.
Lyon, 179 N.Y. 107, 71 N.E. 772 (1904) ; Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 181 N.Y.
121, 73 N.E. 562 (1905).
5. Anything which would "estop the corporation from suing on a cause of action v.111
estop a stockholder from suing as a representative of the corporation on the came c me of
action." 13 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations § 569, at 220 (1943 rev. vol.).
6. Marcus v. Otis, 168 F. 2d 649 (2d Cir. 1948) ; United States Lines Co. v. United States
Lines Inc., 96 F. 2d 143 (2d Cir. 1938) ; Bloom v. National United Ben. Savings and Loan
Co., 81 Hun 120, 30 N.Y. Supp. 700 (1897) ; Breswick and Co. v. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp,
2S0 App. Div. S20, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 25 (2d Dep't 1952), reargument and appeal denied, 250
App. Div. S92, 115 N.YS. 2d 302, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 840, 109 N.E. 2d 712 (1953).
7. 96 F. 2d 143 (2d Cir. 1933).
S. Id. at 151.
9. 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1313 (1951). The writer therein treats this theory as wholly vithout
merit.
10. Saltzman v. Birrell, 78 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 194S).
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subsidiary. For a clear analysis it is necessary here to project this arrangement
at the time the wrong occurred and then at the time the action was instituted.
If control be required at the time of the wrong its justification could only lie
in "piercing the corporate veil."" If a court would allow suit only where it could
pierce the corporate veil then in actuality every derivative would be converted
into a simple derivative suit. The requirement of stock ownership at the time of
the wrong was set up to protect corporations from vexations lawsuits brought by
those buying stock after the accomplishment of the questioned transaction. 12
Though mentioning only simple derivative actions, these statutory limitations
have been brought by analogy into the field of multiple derivative suits.13
Furthermore, a requirement of control can be carried to a mathematical absurd-
ity. Thus, if a party owned a miniscule of stock in a corporation which controlled
another, he could maintain a multiple derivative action; whereas a party owning
forty-nine percent of a corporation which owned forty-nine percent of another
corporation, assuming neither holding constituted control, could not sue to
protect his interest.
The evil at which the statutory requirements aim is the buying of a cause of
action. 14 If this be so can it be said that a plaintiff who at the time of the wrong
owned one percent of A corporation which in turn at the same time owned one
percent of X, the injured corporation, purchased his stock for the purpose of
bringing suit? Obviously not; but plaintiff's stock ownership in A corporation
gives him an interest, albeit indirect in X corporation, and this interest should
be sufficent to maintain the suit.
Where there are thus only two corporations involved-A, the shareholder
corporation, and X, the injured corporation, no one would deny even when no
control existed that the shareholding company has a right to bring a derivative
suit against the wrongdoer. If it did not and as a result the value of the holding
in the injured corporation diminished, the stockholders of the shareholding cor-
poration could call the latter's directors to account for the diminution of its
assets, and might well obtain an order forcing them to bring the action.', To
avoid a multiplicity of suits, the more practical view' 6 would be to allow the
parent's stockholders themselves to bring suits, twice derived for and in behalf
of the injured corporation.
If this be accepted as the basis of the multiple derivative suit, the incident of
controlling interest, as set forth in United States Lines and other cases, must be
rejected as a substantive element of the action. The result in all these cases,
and in the instant case would stand on a firm basis without resort to the indivi-
dual's control of the interlocking corporations.
11. Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances, 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1944) (dictum).
12. Northbridge Co-op, Section No. 1 v. 32nd Ave. Construction Corp., 207 Misc.
164, 136 N.Y.S. 2d 737 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
13. See note 5 supra.
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Koral v. Savory Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 11 N.E. 2d 883 (1937).
16. This theory was suggested in Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F. 2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944),
in respect of multiple derivative suits and was explicitly set forth in Koral v. Savory Inc.,
supra note 15, as the basis of simple derivative actions.
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It is also interesting to note that the present case could have been decided
without abandoning the control requirement as of the time the alleged wrongs
were committed. At that time A had control of X. At the time suit was instituted
A did not have control of X but it did have a minority interest in B which in
turn had an interest in and, in fact, control of X. The court failed to distinguish
between the stockholding requirements for the two times involved. Is there any
reason why control should be required as of the time suit was instituted? For
the complainant to institute suit it should be sufficient that he have an interest in
the controversy. Complainant's stock ownership in A, no matter how small, com-
bined with A's stock ownership in B (no matter how small) and B's stock own-
ership in X (again, no matter how small) gives complainant a sufficient interest
and a standing to sue. It is not for the court to measure the value of the various
stockholdings. Most certainly a recovery would enhance B's holdings and pro-
portionately that of A and complainant. Complainant is thus purged of any
"imputation of being a mere impertinent and officious intermeddler."17
Thus, in line with this reasoning, even if the court retained the control require-
ment as of the time the alleged wrongs were committed it would still not have
had to resort to the individual defendant's controlling interest in the various
corporations. It could simply have resolved the case by dispensing with any
requirement of control as of the time suit was started and by ruling that the
fact that complainant's stock interests were twice-removed from X did not render
complainant a stranger to the controversy.
Corporations-Hospitals Illegally Engaged in the Corporate Practice of
Medicine.-Plaintiffs, a group of charitable Iowa hospitals, paid salaries to
radiologists and pathologists and charged patients for the services of these
specialists. The Iowa Attorney General ruled that this constituted the illegal
corporate practice of medicine. Plaintiffs brought an action to nullify this
ruling, claiming that they were not practicing medicine, but that if they
were, their charitable purposes entitled them to do so. Held, plaintiffs' employ-
ment of specialists constituted the illegal corporate practice of medicine, not-
withstanding their charitable organization. Iowa Hospital Ass'n v. Iova State
Board of Medical Examiners, Equity No. 63095, Iowa Dist. Ct., Polk County.,
Dec. 5, 1955.
Although a corporation, as a legal entity, is in many respects treated as a
person, there are certain rights and privileges which it cannot enjoy.' It is
generally agreed that a corporation may not practice the learned professions.2
17. Holmes v. Camp, 180 App. Div. at 412, 167 N.Y. Supp. at 842 (1st Dep't 1917).
1. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment apply to corporations. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278
U.S. 105 (1928). However, the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth amend-
ment may not be claimed on behalf of a corporation by its officers. Oklahoma Prczs Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 US. 186 (1946).
2. People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P. 2d 429 (1938); In re Co-
operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910); 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corpora-
tions § 97 (1931).
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Statutes that permit incorporation for "any lawful purpose" are construed not
to authorize the corporate practice of the professions. "Any. lawful purpose"
means anything lawful for all individuals to engage in, and only certain quali-
fied individuals may practice the profession. 3
This prohibition against corporate activity in the professions has been based
on two different theories. One is that-the practice is a purely personal privilege
which inures only to qualified, licensed individuals. 4 A corporation cannot ob-
tain a license, since it cannot pass an examination; it ". . . has neither educa-
tion, nor skill, nor ethics."5 It is urged that the confidential relationship that
exists between a physician and patient or attorney and client cannot really
exist between a corporation and the individual. The second theory is that a
profession has a special status which should not be subjected to the vigorous
and often unethical competition of the business world.0
The question as to what constitutes the practice of medicine, seems well
settled. " 'Any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine ...who shall
operate or profess to heal or prescribe for or otherwise treat any physical or
mental ailment of another.' ,,7 Thus, medicine embodies diagnosis, prognosis,
and the determination or application of a remedy.8 Medicine is, therefore,
practiced not only by physicians and surgeons, but also by other specialists
such as pathologists who determine the cause of disease or death, and radio-
logists who employ X-rays and radioactive substances in the diagnosis and
cure of diseases.
A corporation may hire a physician to give medical service to its employees,
just as an attorney may be employed by the corporation to handle its legal
affairs. When, however, the corporation hires a physician to serve the public,
its right to do so is less certain. The question of whether or not the corpora-
tion itself thereby practices medicine would seem to hinge on whether the
physician is to be considered a servant of the corporation or an independent
contractor. If the physician is a servant, the corporation is practicing medicine
since a corporation cannot operate except through its directors and servants. 10
Several courts have applied this reasoning and seem to fear that the loyalty
which a physician or dentist owes to his patient will be superseded by his loyalty
to the corporate employer."
3. People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936); In re Co-
operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910).
4. People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
5. State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 785, 234 N.W. 260, 262 (1931).
6. ". . . [P]ractice of the learned professions by a profit corporation tends to the com-
mercialization and debasement of those professions ... " Bartron v. Codington County,
68 S.D. 309, 329, 2 N.W. 2d 337, 346 (1942).
7. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078, 1079 (1905)
(quoting from Nebraska statute).
8. Underwood v. Scott, 43 Kan. 714, 23 Pac. 942 (1890).
9. See Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E. 2d 801 (1954).
10. Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P. 2d 67 (1932); People v.
Parker, Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pac. 928 (1929).
11. People v. Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P. 2d 429 (1938); Dr. Allison,
Dentist, Inc. v. Allison, 360 Ill. 638, 196 N.E. 799 (1935).
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The better reasoned cases hold that the physician is an independent con-
tractor, since the corporation normally exercises no power over the method by
which he performs his duties.'- There should be no objection to the practicing
of medicine by qualified corporate employees so long as the officers of the
corporation do not interfere with the professional activity of these physicians.13
"Making contracts is not practicing medicine. Collecting the compensation
therefore is not practicing medicine. . . . No professional qualifications are
requisite for doing these things."14 The independent contractor theory has also
permitted corporations to hire dentists,15 chiropodists,'0 and optometrists 17 to
serve the public.
It is paradoxical for the majority view to rule that a corporation practices
medicine through its employees,18 and at the same time to apply the independent
contractor theory and deny a recovery when someone sues on a cause of action
based on the tort of one of these employees.10 The minority view which
applies the independent contractor theory in both situations seems more
consistent.
An exception to the rule that a corporation may not practice medicine exists
in some jurisdictions in the case of public and charitable hospitals,2 which
admit both paying and non-paying patients. Proprietary hospitals, which are
profit-making corporations, offer but space and incidental services to patients
who are sent there by their own physicians and may not engage in the practice
of medicine. 2 '
The instant case not only rejects the independent contractor theory, but also
refuses to make an exception in the case of charitable hospitals. The court
took nearly all of the arguments raised against the practice of medicine by a
profit-making corporation and applied them also to non-profit organizations.
A widespread adoption of the holding of this case would have great practical
effect upon the organization and operation of public and charitable hospitals,2
12. Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D. D.C. 1933); Pearl %v. West End
Street Ry., 176 Mass. 177, 57 N.E. 339 (1900). The Moor case took the very sen ible iview
that licensing statutes have been passed to protect the public from "quacks," rather than
to prevent corporations from hiring physicians.
13. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W. 1078 (1905).
14. Id. at 43, 103 N.W. at 1079 (1905).
15. State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 Pac. 635 (1905).
16. People v. Dr. Scholl's Foot Comfort Shops, Inc., 277 N.Y. 151, 13 N.E. 2d 750
(1938).
17. Dvorine v. Castelberg jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 18S At. 562 (1936); State v.
Kind Optical Co., 235 Wis. 493, 292 N.W. 283 (1940).
18. People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N.Y. 454, S5 N.E. 697
(1903).
19. Schloendorff v. The Society of the New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 10S N.E. 92
(1914).
20. People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N.Y. 4S4, 85 N.E. 697
(1908); Goldwater v. Citizens Casualty Co., 7 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1938).
21. Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S.W. 2d 165 (1938); Golfdwater %. Citizens
Casualty Co., 7 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (N.Y. City Munic. Ct. 1938).
22. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1955, p. 31, col. 8.
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forcing them to operate in the same manner as proprietary hospitals. They
would not be permitted to employ resident physicians, surgeons, radiologists,
pathologists or other specialists. A further effect of the ruling would be to
cripple the present system of interne training.
State police power may be validly and reasonably exercised to prevent profit-
making corporations from practicing medicine, since the incentive to make
money might tend to reduce the quality of the services offered. The same
reasons are not present in the case of non-profit organizations.2 3 The latter
do not debase and commercialize the profession because they have no motive
to compete with individuals or with profit-making organizations. 24 On the
contrary, they free the physician from paper work permitting him to concentrate
on the actual practice of medicine, and offer to the public more efficient and less
expensive medical care than they could obtain from individual physicians.2Y5
Medico-legal concepts should keep abreast of their social and economic
counterparts; there is no valid reason why a corporation should not be permitted
to practice medicine. Since the law already attributes to a corporation the
intent to make contracts and the specific intent to commit torts and crimes,20
why should it not attribute to them the skill and ethics of their licensed em-
ployees? There is no reason to presume beforehand that a corporation would
abuse the privilege. If it did so, the state could not only revoke the license of
any physician involved, but could also revoke the charter of the corporation.
Thus the public might be better served, and none of its protection would be lost.
Corporations-Rival Factions Permitted to Defray Proxy Fight Expendi-
tures from Corporate Treasury Where "Policy" Contest Involved.-Rival
factions in a proxy contest were reimbursed from the corporate treasury
for expenditures incurred in a fight for control of the corporation. Plaintiff
stockholders brought a derivative suit against both defeated and elected directors
for the amount of corporate reimbursements granted to them from the corporate
treasury. The New York Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Ap-
pellate Division unanimously affirmed on the grounds that (1) plaintiff failed
to specify or to prove what portion of the expenditure was unlawful and
(2) that payment of the insurgents' expenses was ratified by a majority of the
stockholders. On appeal, held, one judge concurring, three dissenting, affirmed.
In a contest over policy, as compared to a purely personal power contest, cor-
porate directors have a right to make reasonable and proper expenditures in
order to defend their position and solicit support for their policies. Moreover
stockholders have the right to reimburse successful insurgents for the reasonable
23. "The police power may be exerted . . .only when such legislation bears a real and
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the general
welfare." Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1928).
24. Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 209 (1950).
25. Ibid.
26. Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law, 5 Fordham L. Rev. 207 (1936).
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and bona-fide expenses incurred by them in any such policy contest. Rosenfeld
v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E. 2d 291 (1955).
Management may expend reasonable sums in order to give widespread notice
to stockholders of questions affecting the welfare of the corporation.' The
directors may send out blank proxies printed at the expense of the corporation
and provide postage paid for by the corporation, even where the persons named
are selected by the directors.2 Such expenditures are incidental to management's
duties and properly chargeable to the corporation3 because they advise stock-
holders of questions affecting the latter's interests and are aimed at insuring a
quorum at meetings. 4 There are expenditures, however, which go beyond this.
In recent years we have had the arrival of the professional proxy solicitors and
public relations advisors to proxy contestants, active campaigning by candidates
throughout the country, newspaper and radio advertising, entertaining of stock-
holders, etc. To what extent the corporate treasury should bear such costs is
still an unanswered question.
In Lawyers' Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating
Co.,6 the New York Court of Appeals disallowed recovery for the cost of pub-
lishing newspaper notices in a proxy contest in which the faction in control
sought, so the court said, to perpetuate themselves in office. The court found
that such expenditures were not authorized by the board of directors, nor
legitimately incident to a corporate meeting, nor necessary for stocholder pro-
tection, and therefore not properly chargeable to the corporation.7 The decision
1. "... . there is no impropriety in charging the latter [corporation] with any expm=2
within reasonable limits which were incurred in giving sufficient notice of a rpeial meeting
at which the stockholders would be called upon to decide these questions." Lawyers'
Advertising Co. v. Consolidated Ry. Lighting & Refrigerating Co., 187 N.Y. 395, 399, 80
N.E. 199, 200 (1907).
2. 5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 2058.1 (1952); see also Ballantinc, Corpora-
tions § ISO (1946).
3. "... the company may legitimately do and may defray out of its assets the reason-
able expense of doing all such acts as are reasonably necessary for calling the meeting and
obtaining the best expression of the corporators' views on the questions to be brought
before it." Peel v. London & North Western Ry. Co., 1 Ch. 5, 19 (1907).
4. See, In re Zickl, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1947); McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.Lj.,
p. 461, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1950), Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 663 (1951). See also,
Appeal Printing Co. v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 123 N.Y.L.J., p. 1563, col. 3 (City
Ct. Dec. 21, 1952); Howard v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 129 N.Y.LJ., p. 496, col. 6
(City Ct. Feb. 12, 1953); and Kadel v. Segal Lock & Hardware Co., 130 N.YLJ., p. 483,
col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 20, 1953).
5. Comment, 49 Mfich. L. Rev. 605, 603 (1951).
6. 187 N.Y. 395, 80 N.E. 199 (1907) (the e-xpenditures disallowed involved a follow-up
newspaper solicitation in reply to a circular issued in behalf of an officer attempting to
depose the directors from their control). But d. Rascover v. American Linse.d Co, 135
Fed. 341 (2d Cir 1905) (directors' duty was to notify stockholders, therefore, the corpora-
tion was liable for expenditures incurred in notifying stockholders of a proposd scheme
of consolidation).
7. "This practice of proxy solicitation by the board of directors is tolerated by the
courts, at least until there is an active contest for control and so long as the expense to
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limited management's right to reimbursement solely to expenses incurred in
informing the stockholders that a meeting would be held and that certain
corporate policy issues would be presented. It denied management the right to
make expenditures out of the corporate treasury beyond mere notification of a
proxy contest. Notwithstanding the Lawyers' Advertising case a lower court in
New York recently exhibited a preference for the Delaware rule of policy vs.
personnel.8 This rule allows management to make expenditures in a proxy
contest in which the controversy is concerned with a question of policy as
distinguished from one in which directors seek solely to secure their reelection.9
In the instant case three of the four judges who voted to affirm contended that
the language in Lawyers' Advertising was dictum and chose to follow the
Delaware rule. 10 These three judges ruled that management may incur reason-
able expenses in the solicitation of proxies in order to overcome stockholder
apathy and to secure a quorum; in addition, where there is a contest over policy,
management may in good faith expend such sums reasonably necessary for
defense of its position; however, such expenditures will be disallowed when
fhe contest is purely a fight for power; furthermore, in a policy contest the
stockholders by majority vote may reimburse successful insurgents for reason-
able expenditures incurred."
The dissenting opinion in the present decision took a different view of
Lawyers' Advertising, viz., that payment by a corporation of the expenses of
proceedings by one faction in its contest with another for the control of the
corporation is ultra vires and unlawful and that, consequently, the successful
directors can not seek reimbursement from the corporate treasury. The dissent
recognized management's duty to make reasonable expenditures to inform stock-
holders of corporate matters, but denied that directors could make expenditures
the corporation is small." Rohrlich, Law and Practice in Corporate Control 47 (1933)
(citing Lawyers' Advertising).
8. McGoldrick v. Segal, 124 N.Y.L.J., p. 461, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 1950).
9. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 Ati. 226 (1934);
accord, Hand v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 54 F. Supp. 649 (D. Del. 1944); Empire
Southern Gas Co. v. Gray, 29 Del. Ch. 95, 46 A. 2d 741 (1946); Steinberg v. Adams, 90
F. Supp. 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). For full discussion see Friedman, Expenses of Corporate
Proxy Contests, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 951 (1951). Apparently the only case in the United States
allowing the insurgents to recover their expenditures in a proxy contest is Steinberg v.
Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1950), Note, 36 Cornell L.Q. 558 (1951), Comment,
49 Mich. L. Rev. 605 (1951), Note, 61 Yale L.J. 229 (1952).
10. The concurring opinion was based solely on plaintiff's failure of proof in not urging
liability as to specific expenditures.
11. In the instant case the management group spent $106,000 out of corporate funds
while still in office in defense of their position in said contest. The insurgents won the
election and elected a new board of directors which reimbursed the old board of directors
$28,000 for the remaining expenses of their unsuccessful defense and the insurgents $127,000
for expenses incurred in the proxy contest. Are these reasonable expenditures? It is noted
that in Cullom v. Simmonds, 285 App. Div. 1051, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (2d Dep't 1955) which
was subsequent to the instant case it was held that where attack is made upon the reason-
ableness of specific expenditures that alone would make the complaint sufficient.
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beyond that since such would serve no corporate purpose. It obviously follows
that the dissent would disallow reimbursement of insurgents' expenses in their
entirety since insurgents have no duty to notify stockholders concerning cor-
porate matters. The minority further pointed out that it was no answer to
interpose stockholder ratification as a ground for allowing the insurgents to
recover since ultra vires acts of a corporation cannot be ratified by a mere
majority of the stockholders.'-
The present case is novel in New York in permitting the insurgent group to
reimburse itself for its expenses in a proxy contest; 13 no previous case either
allowed or disallowed an insurgent group to recover for campaign expenses. If
such reimbursement be ultra vires unless the expenses were incurred for the
purpose of informing stockholders of corporate affairs and corporate policies,14
it is difficult to see how the interjection of a policy issue can validate the re-
imbursement. Certainly no group of insurgents is charged with a duty of in-
forming stockholders of corporate policies. On the other hand, the three judges
who voted to follow the Delaware line of cases adopted a fine sounding but
nevertheless deceptive guide.'3 Is not the policy-personnel test an illusory one?
Is it possible to sever questions of policy from those of personnel?'0 May they
not be fused by raising policy issues in any given election? A corporation's
policy is so identified with its supervisory personnel that any substantial policy
change generally necessitates a change in personnel; the election of a new board
of directors is the means of obtaining a new policy. Contestants in a proxy
battle never admit that they have no new program to offer. The criticism
directed at management is not directed at personnel as such but at personnel's
policies, programs or actions. In the instant case the policy issue involved a
long term salary and pension contract extended to one of the board of directors.
In the much-publicized Sparks-Withington proxy contest management was
ousted on charges that it was inefficient and decadent, that officers and directors
12. Davis v. Congregation Beth Tephilas Israel, 40 App. Div. 424, 57 N.Y. Supp. 1015
(Ist Dep't 1899); Schwab v. E.G. Potter Co., 129 App. Div. 36, 113 N.Y. Supp. 439
(lst Dep't 190S).
13. See Steinberg v. Adams, supra note 9.
14. It should be added that as was said in the lower court in the Rosenfeld cae .... the
stockholders were bombarded, first by one side, then by the other, with literature, the
old board defending itself from the attacks of the Fairchild committee, and this committee
in turn vigorously presenting its objections to the old board's policy through letters,
circulars and postcards. ... The expenses incurred by both sides in this contet was for
printing, stationery, postage, attorneys' fees, public relations counsel, and for an agency
which made it a business to solicit, on behalf of corporations proxies for their meetings."
116 N.Y.S. 2d 840, 844-45 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
15. Comment, 49 Alich. L. Rev. 605, 608 (1951). See also, Note, 36 Cornell L.Q. S55
(1951); Note, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 66S (1951); Note 61 Yale LJ. 229 (1952); Friedman, Ex-
penses of Corporate Proxy Contests, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 951 (1951).
16. See Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 171 Ad.




owned too little stock, and that they had too many outside interests."1 Recent
proxy fights indicate that policy issues can skillfully be raised to camouflage
what is essentially a personnel dispute.18
The Court of Appeals has done little to clarify the New York law respecting
corporate expenditures.' 9 The rule advanced by the three judges who voted to
affirm may well beget continuing controversy and prove difficult to administer.
It is also unfortunate that the count divided itself into a 3-1-3 split. The divi-
sion of opinion in the court itself leaves us without a binding precedent.
20
Damages--Conditional Additur Permitted in Personal Injury Action.
-Plaintiff, having obtained a $1,000 verdict in a personal injury action in the
New York Supreme Court, moved for a new trial on the grounds of an in-
adequate verdict. The motion granted, defendant appealed to the Appellate
Division. That court modified the trial court's holding by granting a new trial
unless defendant stipulated to pay $2,500, the maximum amount which the
jury could have awarded as a matter of law. Defendant agreed and the judg-
ment was entered. On appeal plaintiff alleged that the Appellate Division's
modification was unwarranted and a violation of plaintiff's right to trial by
jury. Held, affirmed. The Appellate Division's application of the conditional
additur is a statutory power which is neither contingent upon a trial judge's
abuse of discretion nor violative of the constitutional right to trial by jury.
O'Connor v. Papertsian, 309 N.Y. 465, 131 N.E. 2d 883 (1956).
Early English courts allowed judges to change a jury's award in certain
17. Emerson and Latcham, Further Insight Into More Effective Stockholder Participa-
tion: The Sparks-Withington Proxy Contest, 60 Yale L.J. 429, 432-33 (1951).
18. See, e.g., the recent Montgomery Ward and New York Central proxy contests. See
also, Bollt v. Eastwood, (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill.), no. 55C 17993, complaint filed 12-6-55,
a suit instituted in Illinois by a stockholder against the directors of Montgomery Ward to
require corporate reimbursement of money granted to successful management group and
to enjoin directors from reimbursing the insurgent group. Plaintiff argues that there should
be no reimbursement because there were no corporate policy issues involved in the proxy
contest since management adopted all of the insurgents' policies; therefore, the contest was
purely a personal power one for corporate control. Plaintiff also itemizes the expenditures
that were unreasonable.
19. Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604, 607 (S.D. N.Y. 1950) the court while dis-
cussing the Lawyers' Advertising Co. case acknowledged that the Delaware law contained
more latitude than in New York by asserting that "the instant case is concerned with a
Delaware corporation and the law of that state determines the scope of the corporation's
powers. Both parties, as I have indicated, agree that this case is governed by a less stringent
rule."
20. Since the concurring opinion apparently interpreted the Lawyer's Advertising Co.
case as holding that payment by a corporation of the expense of proceedings by one faction
in its contest with another for the control of the corporation is ultra vires and unlawful,
the weight of the decision's authority is questionable.
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limited cases 1 This system was abandoned2 and the English courts progressed
from granting new trials where the jury's bias resulted in an excesive verdict,3
to granting new trials solely on the grounds of an excessive verdict.4 This was
followed by the court's power to set aside an inadequate verdict and grant a new
trial.6 A method of avoiding further litigation by granting a new trial unless
plaintiff remitted a portion of his excessive verdict was then established.0 The
granting of a new trial unless defendant agreed to increase an inadequate verdict
was also given approval by way of dicta.7 Ultimately, however, the House of
Lords declared the courts to be without the authority to change conditionally
by additur or remittitur a verdict without the consent of both parties.8
In the United States the conditional remittitur was first applied in 18229
and is now generally accepted by federal' 0 and state'1 courts. The conditional
additur, first allowed in 1866, has been considered by only a minority of juris-
dictions with conflicting results.-'
In Dimick v. SchiedtI3 the United States Supreme Court held that the federal
courts, bound by the seventh amendment to the Constitution,"4 were restricted
to the common law existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
Finding no precedents in common law at that time for a conditional additur,
the federal courts were precluded from its use. While this theory has been
uniformly criticized in academic circles's it has been consistently upheld.10 The
1. Y.B. 8 Hen. IV, f. 23, pl. 9 (1407) mayhem; Y.B. 14 Hen. I, f. 19, pl. 22 (1413)
debt; McCormick, Damages § 6 (1935).
2. McCormick, Damages § 6 (1935).
3. Wood v. Gunston, Sty. 466, S2 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
4. Wilford v. Berkeley, 1 Burr. 609, 97 Eng. Rep. 472 (K.B. 1758).
5. See Comment, 40 Calif. L. Rev. 276 (1952).
6. Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q.B.D. 356 (CA.) (1884).
7. Id. at 358. See also Armytage v. Haley, 4 Q.B. 917, 114 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1843) in
which an analogous device was used. "... plaintiff, obtained a rule to shew caure why a
new trial should not be had, unless defendant would consent to the damages being increased
to 101 5s. 6d."
8. Watt v. Watt, [19051 A.C. 115.
9. Blunt v. Little, 3 Fed. Cas. 760, No. 1578 (C.C. Mass. 1822).
10. Arkansas Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 US. 69 (1839); Bucher v. Krause, 200 F. 2d 576
(7th Cir. 1952).
11. See cases collected in Annot., 11 A.L.R. 2d 1217 (1950).
12. See note 5 supra.
13. 293 US. 474 (1935).
14. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shal be otherwiLe
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rulea of the common
law." U.S. Const. amend. VII.
15. 4 Fordham L. Rev. 344 (1935); 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1551 (1934); 43 Harv. L. Rev.
333 (1934); 33 Mich. L. Rev. 138 (1934).
16. See Miller v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 220 F. 2d 434 (5th Cir. 195S);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F. 2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951); Relsberg v. Walters, 111 F. 2d
595 (6th Cir. 1940).
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seventh amendment, however, is not binding upon the states17 nor has it been
incorporated into the "due process clause" of the fourteenth amendment,18 with
the result that state constitutions govern the validity of the additur within their
respective jurisdictions.19 A majority of the states that have considered the
validity of the additur approve it,20 some states allowing it whether the damages
are liquidated or unliquidated, while others permit it only where the damages
are liquidated.2 '
In New York a trial judge has the statutory authority to set aside an ex-
cessive or inadequate verdict and order a new trial.22 This power is limited by
the fact that the assessment of damages is ordinarily peculiarly within the
province of the jury, at least where the damages are not susceptible to mathe-
matical compilation.3 It is not, therefore, sufficient that the trial judge merely
disagree with the verdict.2 4 The verdict must be unconscionable.25 As a corol-
lary of this power New York has allowed the conditional remittitur in both
contract 26 and personal injury actions.27 A trial judge may not, however, reduce
the verdict to nominal damages,28 dismiss a complaint for failure to remit,20 or
adjust the verdict against the will of both parties.3 0 Nor where error in the
trial gives the defendant an absolute right to a new trial, may the court attempt
to remedy the error by ordering a reduction in the verdict.31
The New York appellate courts have either taken advantage of the con-
ditional additur32 or indicated approval. 33 However, if plaintiff has remitted
a part of his verdict at the trial level and defendant appeals the verdict as still
being excessive, the appellate court may increase the verdict appealed from but
not so as to exceed the original verdict.34 While it has been the practice of lower
17. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
18. Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917). See also Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640
(1948); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
19. Dorsey v. Barba, 38 Cal. App. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
20. McCormick, Damages § 19 at 82 (1935).
21. See cases collected in 66 C. J. S. New Trial § 207(g) (1950).
22. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 549.
23. Quillen v. Board of Education, 203 Misc. 320, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 122 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
24. Ibid.
25. Cesario v. Demetria Realty Corp., 250 App. Div. 272, 294 N.Y. Supp. 26 (1st Dep't
1937).
26. Herrman v. United States Trust Co., 221 N.Y. 143, 116 N.E. 865 (1917).
27. Williams v. Smith, 280 App. Div. 1033, 117 N.Y.S. 2d 101 (4th Dep't 1952).
28. Howard v. Bank of Metropolis, 115 App. Div. 326, 100 N.Y. Supp. 1003 (lst Dep't
1906).
29. Rosenthal v. Bellamy Trading, Inc., 63 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
30. See note 28 supra.
31. Bishop v. New York Times Co., 233 N.Y. 446, 135 N.E. 845 (1922).
32. lannotta v. Integrity Holding Corp., 269 App. Div. 1044, 58 N.Y.S. 2d 636 (2d Dep't
1945) ; Gablas v. Jones, 262 App. Div. 794, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 314 (3d Dep't 1941).
33. Kligman v. City of New York, 281 App. Div. 93, 117 N.Y.S. 2d 436 (1st Dep't
1952).
34. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 584-a.
[Vol. 25
CASE NOTES
courts to apply the conditional additur35 the consent of both parties was some-
times required.36
The instant case held that a trial judge or the Appellate Division may use
the conditional additur in a personal injury action with defendant's consent
alone. Furthermore, unlike some jurisdictions,37 the appellate court's power is
not contingent upon a trial judge's abuse of discretion.33
Having previously held that the right to trial by jury as granted by the
Constitution of New York39 is not limited by common law precedents existing
at the time of its adoption 40 the court is spared the necessity of rebutting or
distinguishing the Dimick v. Schiedt41 opinion in that respect. The Dimic. case,
unlike the instant case, expressly disallows any argument by analogy from the
validity of the remittitur to the validity of the additur, arguing that the former
is still within the jury's award while the latter is a mere addition by the court.
This argument would seem to be questionable in so far as in either case the
court substitutes its verdict for that of the jury.
In any event it might be argued that the instant case does not in fact involve
a constitutional problem. Having the power to declare a monetary limit beyond
which a jury may not find an award for damages and in setting an additur at
that limit, the court would not seem to be encroaching upon the province of
the jury.
A logical progression of the court's reasoning would dearly indicate that a
conditional additur should be allowed in an appropriate contract action. Further,
since a remittitur need only be set at an adequate sums it would appear that
in either a contract or personal injury action, an additur might validly be set
at an amount which, while more than an inadequate verdict, is less than the
maximum amount a jury could award as a matter of law.
Domestic Relations-Full Faith and Credit Accorded Amended Nevada
Divorce Decree.-Plaintiff and defendant went to Nevada where defendant
obtained a default decree of divorce from his first wife. On the same day
plaintiff and defendant were married. Two years later defendant and his
first wife entered into a written agreement whereby she agreed to file a notice
of appearance in the original divorce action. The appearance was filed and a
decree issued in April, 1954, amending, nunc pro tunc, the decree of June, 1952.
In September, 1954 the second wife began this action for an annulment on the
35. See note 23 supra.
36. Carrosseaux v. City of Newv York, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 761 (Sup. CL 1954).
37. McCann v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry., 117 Neb. 786, 222 N.W. 633 (1929).
38. Hogan v. Franken, 221 App. Div. 164, 223 N.Y. Supp. 1 (3d Dep't 1927).
39. "The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used eball remain
inviolate forever. . . ." N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2.
40. Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, 10 N.E. 192 (1915).
41. See note 13 supra.
42. Dembitz v. Orange County Traction Co., 147 App. Div. 583, 132 N.Y. Supp. 593
(2d Dep't 1911).
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ground that defendant's first marriage had never been legally dissolved or, in
the alternative, to obtain a separation on the ground of defendant's cruel and
inhuman treatment. In denying plaintiff's right to attack the original decree,
the court held that, since the nunc pro tunc appearance was permitted by the
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution requires recognition of the amended decree. Chusid v.
Chusid, 207 Misc. 1039, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 846 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a collateral attack on
a foreign ex partel divorce decree, based upon a finding that neither spouse was
domiciled in that state at the time the decree was granted, is not a violation of
the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.2 The right to make a col-
lateral attack however, has been denied to a defendant who has appeared and
participated in the divorce proceedings and who would not be permitted to
attack the decree in the state in which it was rendered.8 A third person's right
of attack upon a judgment, binding on the parties themselves under the doctrine
of res judicata, has been held to depend on the laws of the granting state.4
In the principal case, the court acknowledged the possibility of a jurisdictional
defect in the original divorce proceedings but precluded any collateral attack
because of a Nevada statute permitting default decrees to be amended nunc
pro tunc by a subsequent appearance of the party in default.5 Conceding that
the defendant's second marriage was vulnerable because at the time it was con-
tracted he was not duly divorced from his first wife, the court nevertheless
decided that the amended decree had cured this defect and had rendered the
marriage invulnerable. The effect which a Nevada court would say the statute
had upon plaintiff's rights was not mentioned.
The Nevada statute expressly states that an appearance entered nunc pro
tunc shall have the same effect as if it had been entered at the proper time
and that the decree shall be amended only to the extent of showing such
appearance. An immediate effect of such an appearance might be to bind the
party so appearing by res judicata, but the court in the principal case denied a
third person the right to make a collateral attack. Assuming that the parties to
the divorce are bound, was this a proper determination of the plaintiff's status
according to the laws of Nevada?
1. "Ex parte," as used in the context, has reference to a divorce action in which the
court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
2. Williams v. North Carolina, II, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
3. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
4. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
5. Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(d). "Default Judgments: Modification
Nunc pro Tunc. Whenever a default judgment or decree has been entered, the party or
parties in default therein may at any time thereafter, . . . enter general appearance In the
action, and the general appearance so entered shall have the same force and effect as if
entered at the proper time prior to the rendition of the judgment or decree. On such
appearance being entered the court may make and enter a modified judgment or decree
to the extent only of showing such general appearance . . . and it shall be entered nunc
pro tunc as of the date of the original judgment or decree .... "
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The right of a third party to attack a judgment has heretofore been litigated
in several jurisdictions. In Johnson v. MuelbergcrG the United States Supreme
Court noted that Florida will allow impeachment only by those strangers who,
if the judgment were given full credit and effect, would be prejudiced in regard
to some pre-existing right7 and accordingly sister states are bound by full faith
and credit. Other jurisdictions, including California s Massachusetts 9 and South
Carolina'0 have adopted the same rule. Nevada Reports however, give little
indication as to whether that state would follow suit. In re Veltri's Estate"
presented a New York court with the problem of an attempted third party
collateral attack on a Nevada divorce decree. In the Veltri case petitioners
sought to recover letters of administration issued to decedent's second wife by
showing that her Nevada divorce from her first husband was in-alid and that
she was not therefore the decedent's surviving spouse. Because the divorce in
question had been obtained in an ex parle action, the court, without recourse
to the laws of Nevada, permitted the petitioners to attack the decree. The
doctrine of Johnson v. Muelberger was limited to true adversary proceedings
and was held inapplicable to situations where the court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion of both parties. To augment its decision, the court e.x-pressed a belief that
Nevada too, would permit the attack if presented with the same problem. ='
Although there was no controlling authority on the point the influence of Cali-
fornia case law on Nevada law was deemed sufficient to dictate this result.
Applying the distinction set forth in the Veltri case, into which category does
the present case fall? Is it to be considered an ex parte proceeding or one in
which both parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the rendering court? If the
former, the plaintiff's right of attack is established by the Veltri case; if the
latter, her status must be determined according to the laws of Nevada. This
second alternative again presents a problem without precedent. California has
demanded that a third party be prejudiced in regard to a pre-existing right be-
fore being permitted to attack a divorce decree. If Nevada should once more
follow California's lead,' 3 the present plaintiff could not attack the decree since
she had no rights existing prior to its rendition which she could protect by
showing its invalidity. A conclusive answer to the problem awaits determination
by the Nevada Supreme Court.
6. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
7. Id. at 583, citing I Freeman on Judgments § 319 (5th ed. 1925).
S. Mumma v. Mlumma, S6, Cal. App. 2d 133, 194 P. 2d 24 (1943).
9. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Porter, 324 Mass. 581, 33 N.E. 2d 135 (1949).
10. Ex paste Nimmer, 212 S.C. 311, 47 S.E. 2d 716 (1948).
11. 202 msc. 401, 113 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
12. In Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952), the concurring opinion of Wr. justice
Frankfurter recognized the inherent problem that any conjectural attempt to determine the
law of another state could readily be supplanted by an official determination by that state
to the contrary.
13. There is some support for this contention to be found in Zeig v. Zg, 65 Nev. 464,
198 P. 2d 724, 730 (1943), where the broad principal is stated that: "It is elementary under
our system of legal procedure, that everyone who may be materially affected by the action
or a court in a legal proceeding is entitled to be heard .... 1
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Appearances entered nunc pro tunc in divorce actions are by no means novel.
In 1931 Nevada enacted a similar statute,14 and New York was called on to
determine its effect on a second marriage.15 The New York court held that
since the original decree was invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction, a
subsequent void marriage could not be validated by the amended decree. Prior
to the decision in Sherrer v. Sherrer,'6 New York had generally refused to
recognize a nunc pro tunc appearance as curative of a jurisdictional defect in a
foreign divorce proceeding' 7 and an attempt to do it in New York was declared
to be against public policy.' 8 In treating orders nunc pro tunc, Nevada has held
that parties by their mutual consent, cannot give the court jurisdiction to do
something which it could not have done originally.19 In Missouri, a nunc pro
tunc order has been declared incapable of giving life to a void judgment.20
Neither the policy of New York nor of Nevada would seem to justify the effect
given the subsequent appearance in the principal case.
While the requirement of domicile has been the target of much criticism,
21
it is still the foundation of jurisdiction in a divorce action.2 2 To prevent col-
lateral inquiry into this vital jurisdictional fact merely because the defendant
has made a nunc pro tunc appearance would permit a waiver of jurisdiction by
the parties, a practice condemned by the Nevada Supreme Court in 1949.23 To
allow a waiver by statute would contradict a well reasoned decision by the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals in Alton v. Alton, 24 declaring invalid
any statute making divorce a transitory action. Whether the court was correct
or not in denying the plaintiff's right to attack her husband's divorce from his
first wife, the reasoning if followed, would permit a perpetration of fraud by
the parties to a divorce; for if the state, too, is to be bound by the amended
decree, then the parties themselves can provide a collusive avenue of escape
from prosecution for bigamy.
Thus, the decision of the principal case indicates that the plaintiff who at
one time would have been permitted to impeach the judgment, is now to be
denied that right because the amended decree is entitled to full faith and credit.
It is difficult to see how a judgment, quite probably void in its inception, can,
14. Stat. Nev. 1931 c. 156.
15. Hinderman v. Hinderman, 245 App. Div. 246, 280 N.Y. Supp. 499 (2d Dep't 1935).
16. 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
17. In re Lindgren's Estate, 293 N.Y. 18, 55 N.E. 2d 849 (1944).
18. Oberlander v. Oberlander, 179 Misc. 459, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (Dona. Rel. Ct. 1943).
19. Finley v. Finley, 65 Nev. 113, 189 P. 2d 334, modified in rehearing, 65 Nev. 122,
196 P. 2d 766 (1948).
20. State v. Pemberton, 235 Mo. App. 1128, 151 S.W. 2d 111 (1941).
21.- Dissenting opinions in Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1 (1955);
Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 23 Fordham L. Rev. 206 (1954).
22. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
23. Wilson v. Wilson, 66 Nev. 405, 212 P.2d 1066 (1949).
24. 207 F. 2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), 23 Fordham L. Rev. 206 (1954). On certiorari to
the Supreme Court the point of the case was held to be moot since, subsequent to tho
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals, the parties had obtained a valid decree of divorce
in Conn. 347 U.S. 610 (1954).
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by a subsequent act of the parties, be validated even to the extent of denying
certain strangers the right to attack it collaterally. The constitutionality of a
statute which would permit this result is questionable and was the proper issue
to be determined by the court.
Evidence - Federal Agent Enjoined From Testifying in State Criminal
Action Where Evidence Was Obtained by Invalid Federal Process.-An
indictment brought in a Federal District Court against petitioner for unlawful
acquisition of marihuana was based upon evidence obtained by a federal agent
through an improperly issued federal warrant. Petitioner made a motion to
suppress the evidence which the District Court granted. On motion of the gov-
ernment, the indictment was dismissed. Subsequently, the federal agent swore
to a complaint before a New Mexico judge who issued a warrant for petitioner's
arrest for unlawful possession of marihuana in violation of New Mexico law.
The Federal District Court denied petitioner's motion to enjoin the federal agent
from testifying in the New Mexico action and to direct him to reacquire and
dispose of the evidence. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial. On appeal, keld, four justices dissenting, reversed. Since the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe the standards for federal law enforce-
ment, over which the Supreme Court has supervisory powers, the federal courts
have power to enjoin a federal agent from using evidence obtained in violation
of those rules in a state criminal prosecution. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214
(1956).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v. United States,' evidence
obtained illegally, if relevant, was admissible in both federal and state courts.
The illegality involved in obtaining the evidence was considered a collateral
issue and the only remedy available to one convicted on such evidence was
against the officer responsible for the illegal seizure.- In the Boyd case it was
held that under the fourth amendment 3 such evidence could be excluded in the
federal courts. Although Adams v. New York4 seemed virtually to obviate the
rule of the Boyd case, the doctrine was reaffirmed and became firmly established
by the Court's decision in Weeks v. United States,* wherein it was held that
upon seasonable motion for its return, illegally acquired evidence may not be
retained by the federal authorities and a conviction based upon such evidence
must be reversed. Though the rationale involved in excluding the evidence was
not without severe criticism,6 the Weeks case has been consistently upheld by
1. 116 U.S. 616 (18S6).
2. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
3. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
4. 192 US. 585 (1904). The Court there drew a factual distinction taking the ca.se
before it out of the Boyd rule in that a valid warrant vms issued to conduct a s-earch for
gambling equipment and incidental to this certain private papers of defendant were found.
The Court said these papers could be admitted without negating the Boyd rule. However,
the distinction is difficult to reconcile with the reasoning of the Boyd case.
5. 232 U.S: 383 (1914).
6. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2184, at 40 (3d ed. 1940); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the
Law, 24 Cornell L.Q. 337, 354 (1938).
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the federal courts7 and is now embodied in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure.8 The case has been instrumental in causing several of the states to follow
the rule it established.9 Nevertheless, most states have rejected the rule and
have continued to admit relevant evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure.' 0
Noting the rejection of the Weeks doctrine in many of the states, the Court
held in Wolf v. Colorado," that due process of law as required by the fourteenth
amendment 12 is not violated if conviction is had in a state court for a state
offense upon evidence illegally obtained. The Court there noted with approval
the prior decision in Palko v. Connecticut,'3 which held that the concept of
"ordered liberty"' 4 does not require that the fourteenth amendment protect
against state action which would be violative of the fourth amendment if done
by the federal government. The Court expressly indicated in the Wolf case that
even though exclusion of evidence is an effective means of deterring unreasonable
searches, it would not question a state's reliance upon other effective methods
of accomplishing the same result.15 Hence it is apparent that in the absence of
coercion, the federal courts will not disturb a conviction of a state court on
grounds of due process where the evidence has been obtained through illegal
search and seizure.1 6
In the principal case, rejecting the applicability to the problem of constitu-
tional considerations, the Court based its holding upon its supervisory powers
over federal law enforcement agencies, referring to McNabb v. United States.'
In that case, having expressly eliminated constitutional considerations, the Court
confined itself to the formulation of a federal rule of evidence to be observed in the
federal courts. By way of dicta, the Court further stated that review by it of
state action regarding the administration of criminal justice demands appropriate
respect for the judgment of a state in so basic an exercise of its jurisdiction. 18
7. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313
(1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
8. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e).
9. See appendix to Court's opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
10. Ibid; see also opinion of Judge Cardozo in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.
585 (1926).
11. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
,12.. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
13. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
14. Id. at 325.
15. 338 U.S. 25, 31 (1949).
16. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), where there was the element of coerdon
since police officers assaulted the defendant. This the Court indicated was itself violative of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See also Dawson, The Outstanding
Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court In 1954, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 187, 196
(1955)..
17. 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (Petitioners' admissions, obtained by constant and lengthy
questioning before being brought before a committing magistrate, were improperly admitted




In the instant case, is it logical to ignore the constitutional question and yet
extend a federal rule of evidence so as to bar evidence which is the very founda-
tion of a state criminal proceeding? It is difficult to comprehend how this can
be done and it is certainly without precedent. 9
Because the crime charged in the principal case violated a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code, °0 the evidence seized was contraband and was therefore
both non-repleviable and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts
of the United States.21 This fact was apparently considered by the Court in its
decision to grant the injunctive relief sought. However, it is well established
that a federal court will not exercise its equity powers to enjoin a state criminal
proceeding unless irreparable harm would result.22 Accordingly, in Stefannelli
v. Alinard2 the Court refused to enjoin the use of evidence in state criminal
proceedings claimed to have been obtained by an unlawful search and seizure
by state police. The decision was based upon the power of courts of equity to
exercise discretion and expressed the Court's reluctance to enjoin criminal pro-
ceedings. Though the Stefannelli case may be factually distinguished from the
principal case since the federal agent here acted upon federal process, the dis-
tinction seems tenuous in light of the precarious balance to be maintained
between state and federal interests. Indeed the present injunction just as effec-
tively terminates New Mexico's criminal prosecution as would enjoining a state
official.
In view of the decisions of the Court which formulated the federal exclusionary
rule regarding illegally obtained evidence, it appears that such exclusion is based
upon a judicially propounded rule of evidence. This being so, it is difficult to
perceive the propriety of invoking a federal statute regarding contraband in such
a manner as to preclude a state criminal prosecution, thereby enforcing in
reality, a federal rule of evidence upon a state court. It is submitted that the
Court in the instant case should have either refused the injunctive relief sought
or faced the constitutional questions considered in the Wolf case.
19. The dissent in the principal case points out that the McNabb rule has not been
extended to state criminal proceedings, citing Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953);
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
20. 26 U.S.C.A. § 2593(a).
21. 23 U.S.CAL § 2463.
22. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943), where the Court said:
"Congress, by its legislation, has adopted the policy, with certain well defined statutory
exceptions, of leaving generally to the state courts the trial of criminal cases arsing under
state laws, subject to review by this Court of any federal quLstions involved. Hence, courts
of equity in the exercise of their discretionary powers should conform to this policy by
refusing to interfere with or embarass threatened proceedings in state courts save in those
exceptional cases which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent injury which
is clear and imminenL..."
23. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
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Insurance-Appraisal Agreement in Standard Fire Insurance Policy not
Subject to Arbitration.-Petitioner was insured by several insurance com-
panies. A fire occurred causing considerable damage to the insured's prop-
erty. Each of the several fire insurance policies contained a provision for
appraisal in the event of loss in the form required by section 168 of the New
York Insurance Law. The insurance companies refused to consent to an ap-
praisal. Thereupon the insured initiated an action to compel the insurers' com-
pliance with the policies' appraisal provisions, pursuant to section 1450 of the
New York Civil Practice Act, governing the enforcement of a contract or sub-
mission for arbitration. The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, granted
an order directing the insurers to proceed to arbitration and appraisal; the Ap-
pellate Division reversed the order and dismissed the petition. Upon appeal,
held, affirmed. The provisions for appraisals and valuations did not constitute
enforceable agreements to arbitrate controversies in accordance with section
1448 of the Civil Practice Act. In the Matter of Delmar Box Co., 309 N.Y.
60, 127 N.E. 2d 808 (1955).
The appraisal clause in a standard fire insurance policy1 was adopted to
offer a prompt and inexpensive method of adjusting disputes between the
parties regarding values and extent of damage. Traditionally the courts have
distinguished between an arbitration and an appraisal proceeding. Arbitration
is a formal substitute for the judgment of a court wherein legal rules of evidence
are applicable.2 In most jurisdictions it is regulated by statute and involves
disposition of the entire controversy. Conversely, an appraisal procedure is an
informal inquiry to determine the amount of loss, and the strict rules governing
arbitration are not applicable.3
In numerous instances the terms appraisal and arbitration have been used
interchangeably because of their analogous characteristics. 4 Where the rules
governing arbitrations are applied to proceedings of appraisal for determining
the amount of loss under insurance policies, it is immaterial that the persons
who are to fix the amount of the loss are called appraisers, referees, arbitrators,
or otherwise.5 Whether a provision in a fire insurance policy be designated an
appraisal or an arbitration clause, the ultimate purpose of that agreement is
to settle differences or disputes that may arise between the insured and the
insurer without resort to the courts.6
Enacted in 1920, section 1448 of the New York Civil Practice Act in sub-
1. "Appraisal. In case the insured and this Company shall fail to agree as to the actual
cash value or the amount of loss, then, on the written demand of either, each shall select
a competent and disinterested appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser selected....
The appraisers shall then appraise the loss . . . and, failing to agree, shall submit their
differences, only, to the umpire .... " N.Y. Insurance Law § 168(6).
2. 3 Richards, Insurance § 549 (1952).
3. 7 Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law § 1604 (1930).
4. See note 2 supra.
5. Hanley v. Aetna Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 425, 102 N.E. 641 (1913); American Cent. Ins.
Co., v. District Ct., 125 Minn. 374, 375, 147 N.W. 242, 243 (1914).
6. See note 2 supra.
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stance authorizes persons to submit their controversies to arbitration' Four
years later, the Court of Appeals in Matter of Fletchers held that a distinction
edsted, under the language of the arbitration law, between an appraisal and
arbitration. The court reasoned that the statute did not pertain to matters
incidental to a contract submitted to arbitration. By analogy, an appraisal clause
which is incidental to a fire insurance policy would not constitute an arbitration
clause. In 1941, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York considered
the desirability of amending the arbitration law so as to avoid the ruling in the
Fletcher case and cases which followed it.9 Such an amendment 0 was recom-
mended and later adopted by the legislature."1 It was intended that the amend-
ment permit other controversies incidental and related to the main issue to come
within the purview of arbitration so long as the main issue itself was arbitrable
under the statute.'-
In Matter of Fitzgerald,13 the Appellate Division, Third Department, seem-
ingly went beyond this legislative intendment. The court there held that the
amendment sufficiently broadened the scope of the arbitration law, to en-
compass agreements for appraisal under a fire insurance policy independent
of any agreement to arbitrate. The following year, however, the Court of
Appeals in Syracuse Savings Bank v. Yorkshire Ins. Co. 4 in dictum refused
7. "Except as otherwise prescribed in this section, two or more persons may submit to
the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing betwcen them at the
time of the submission, which may be the subject of an action, or they may contract to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them and such submision
or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable . . . 21 N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1443.
"The making of a contract or submission for arbitration .... The court. ... shall hear
the parties and upon being satisfied... shall make an order directing the parties to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the contract or submission." N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Act § 1450.
S. 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924).
9. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Annual Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Arbitration 315 (1940).
10. Id. at 415 (1941) provides: "Such submission or contract may include questions
arising out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral,
incidental, precedent, or subsequent to any issue between the parties. '
11. Id. at 337. Report of the Special Committee on Arbitration: "The propo:-d bill
was approved at a meeting of the association. Thereafter, the bill was introduced in
the Assembly, and the Senate, with the result that it passed both Houses and has just
been approved by the Governor."
12. Id. at 217 (1945).
13. 275 App. Div. 453, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 430 (1949).
14. 301 N.Y. 403, 94 N.E. 2d 73 (1951). The decision involved an appraisal and no
question of right to appraisal arose. The court held that a mortgagee under the standard
mortgagee clause attached to a fire insurance policy had a right to participate in the ap-
praisal. A second question presented was whether a corporation could be an appraiser
and the court held that it could so act. Lastly, the court weighed the sufficiency of the
written oath signed by the corporation and attached to the appraisal. In this connection
judge Dye said, in p4assng, that it was well established that an appraisal was not an arbitra-
tion citing older cases prior to the 1941 amendment, and placed his decision on (stoppcl
19561
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
to sanction this extension of the statute and stated that the amendment did
not require an appraisal under the insurance law to be treated as an arbitration
proceeding. It was at this point that the legislature again amended section
1448, and inserted the words or independent of in the sentence added in 1941.
The legislature had apparently approved of the reasoning of the Fitzgerald case
which was designed to remedy the inequitable situation then existing. While
the insured was unable to compel the insurance company specifically to comply
with the appraisal provisions, the insured himself was prevented from suing on
the policy in the event of his failure to comply with the provisions."5 It appears
inescapable that the new phrase was an attempt to afford the insured an ex-
peditious and inexpensive remedy and to settle the question of whether or not
to allow controversies arising out of appraisals or valuations, which may be
incidental to, or independent of the issue between the parties, also to come
within the purview of the statute. In a memorandum to the Governor,'0 by
the proposer of the amendment, it was explained that the reason for inserting
the phrase was to allow valuations and appraisals to come within the arbitration
law even though they were independent of any other controversy. The com-
munication emphasized that evaluations and appraisals are necessary to com-
mercial transactions and that the parties should be given an enforceable remedy,
which they could not otherwise enjoy.
Disregarding the memorandum and stressing the procedural differences be-
as to one party and the fire insurance mortgagee clause as to the other. The concurring
and dissenting opinions did not discuss appraisals as arbitrations.
15. The insured, in order to maintain an action upon the policies, is bound to prove his
compliance with all of the policy's conditions, and a refusal to accept the insurer's demand
for an appraisal constitutes a non compliance fatal to his cause of action. See Silver v.
Western Assurance Co., 164 N.Y. 381, 58 N.E. 284 (1900). If the insured demands an
appraisal the only affect of the insurer's refusal is its subjection to an action at law on
the policy. Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248 (1924).
16. New York State Legislature Annual 40 (1953). The following is a copy of the
memorandum filed by Assemblyman Teller with the Governor. "... . [Tihe second paragraph
of section 1448 is amended by inserting the words 'or independent of' so as to clarify that
valuations or appraisals come within the scope of the arbitration statute even though they
are independent of any other controversy.
"The necessity for this amendment may be gleaned from the decision in Fitzgerald (case).
. . . The New York arbitration statute did not formerly cover appraisals and valuations.
Hence a provision for an appraisal was unenforceable. The sole remedy for breach of such
provision was found in the law covering breach of contracts.
".. [I]n the Fitzgerald case, the question was raised whether the amendment applied to
a fire insurance contract clause which provided for appraisal for loss. The Insurance com-
pany contended that the amendment was inapplicable since appraisal was not 'included'
in any arbitration agreement. By a process of judicial legislation the Court denied this
apparently correct contention, and held that an independent appraisal agreement may be
enforced under the statute....
[... tilt seems clear that evaluations and appraisals are vitally necessary transactions....
[Tihe proposed amendment in this bill adopts the rationale of the Fitzgerald case and
makes it clear that when parties agree to evaluations or appraisals the law will enforce
such agreements because of the commercial desirability of doing so."
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tween arbitration and appraisal the court in the present case has refused to
allow the latter to come within the scope of the statute. It is manifest that
the legislature was also aware of this distinction, yet it purposefully passed
the 1952 amendment in order to engulf appraisals under the arbitration law.
For what reason would the legislature amend a statute except to modify the
existing law? Indeed, as this very Court of Appeals has so recently stated,
".. . [I]n the interpretation of a statute we must assume that the legislature
did not deliberately place a phrase in the statute which was intended to serve
no purpose." 17
The Supreme Court of the United States in considering the constitutionality
of a state enactment which required use of an appraisal clause similar to that
adopted by New York, has held the enforcement of such provision to be ad-
vantageous as well as valid.1 s Elsewhere in states not providing for such statutes
the courts have held that such agreements are binding upon the parties, reason-
ing that the law favors awards and adjustments of differences without
litigation.19
While the section does not specifically mention appraisals under a fire in-
surance policy, the statute is a permissive one, and its terms are broad enough
to include such appraisals. Unless the amendments to it be so construed they
accomplish nothing; thus a construction by the court that they indicate no
legislative intent to alter the statute seems unwarranted.
Parent and Child-Negligence - Child's Right to Recover for Loss of
Consortium of Injured Parent.-Plaintffs, five minor children, brought an
action for the impairment of their rights (support, education, acts of kindness,
and solace) proximately resulting from a personal injury to their mother caused
by defendant's negligence. In denying defendant's motion to dismiss the court
held that the complaint stated a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955).
Support, education, care, attention, comfort, acts of kindness and solace are
among those rights arising out of the family relationship' and can be referred
17. In the Matter of Smathers, - N.Y. -s - N.E2d - (1936). Se- alo, Matter of
Zellner, 299 N.Y. 243, 247, S6 N.E. 2d 657, 659 (1949); People v. Dethloff, 283 N.Y. 309,
315, 28 N.E. 2d 850, 852 (1940).
1. Hardware Dealers Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
19. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Gilleland 79 Ga. App. IS, S2 S.E. 2d 537 (1949); Johns v.
Security Ins. Co., 49 Ga. App. 125, 174 S.E. 215 (1934); Ex parte Birmingham Fire Ins.
Co., 233 Ala. 370, 172 So. 99 (1937).
1. See 41 Ill. L. Rev. 444, 445 n. 2 (1946) citing Green, Cases on Injuries to Relations
(1940): "Relation is the best term available to express the value of one human being to
another. It is distinct from the personality of either person to the relation and from tangible
things outside the personality." See also, Green, "Relational Interests": Family Relations,
29 EL L. Rev. 460 (1934).
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to collectively as consortium.2 From the time these intra-family interests were
first recognized, the rights of the various members of the family to enforce them
against interfering third parties have received inconsistent treatment.3
A husband's action to recover for loss of consortium has been almost uni-
versally accepted whether the meddling defendant be guilty of a willful 4 or
merely negligent5 wrong. A wife's right of action in similar situations has not
been so readily upheld, and has resulted in curious distinctions which were never
alluded to when the husband's rights were under consideration. The common
law theory, that a married woman could not maintain an action in her own
name,6 neatly avoided any need of judicial determination on the point, but with
the passage of the married woman's emancipation acts,7 decisions were forth-
coming. With their enactment a conflict of authority appeared as a few juris-
dictions continued to deny the wife's right of action for consortium on the theory
that those statutes were not intended to add any new substantive rights.8 The
majority view maintained that the right, always extant, was now legally enforce-
able since the only impediment, a strictly procedural one, had been removed.0
Among these latter states a further division resulted from holdings that if the
defendant were guilty of criminal conversation,' 0 or alienation of affection,"
recovery was allowed. If the wrong done, however, was only a negligent one
recovery was denied.12 Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,'3 decided in 1950, was the first
case to recognize a wife's right of action for consortium where her husband had
been injured by the negligence of another and this decision has since been fol-
lowed in several jurisdictions.' 4 As parents, the right of recovery of either the
husband or the wife has been enforced where the child has been the victim of a
2. While the term "consortium" is generally restricted to the relationship of husband and
wife it will herein refer also to the relationship of parent and child. See 6 Okla. L. Rev.
500 (1953); 6 Vand. L. Rev. 926 (1953).
3. Prosser, Torts, § 103, at 682-98 (2d ed. 1955).
4. Johnston v. Allen, 100 N.C. 131, 5 S.E. 666 (1888).
5. Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 196 S.C. 230,13 S.E. 2d 1 (1941).
6. "By the common law the suit for a tort to the wife could not be sued by her alone by
preponderance of authority." Gross v. Gross, 70 W. Va. 317, 73 S.E. 961 (1912).
7. See 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 150 (1935).
8. Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890).
9. Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891).
10. Roberts v. Roberts, 230 Ky. 165, 18 S.W. 2d 981 (1929).
11. Red Eagle v. Free, 191 Okla. 385, 130 P. 2d 308 (1942).
12. Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935); Sheard v. Oregon
Electric Ry., 137 Or. 341, 2 P. 2d 916 (1931); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 At.
538 (1918).
13. 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), 20 Fordham L. Rev.
342 (1951). Hipp v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921) was
the first case to recognize the wife's right to consortium, but the theory of the decision was
substantially overruled by Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307
(1925).
14. Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc. 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E. 2d 24 (1953);
Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953), 41 Geo. L.J. 443 (1953); Brown v.
Curtin & Johnson, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1954).
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physical injury, abduction,16 or seduction 17 but not for mere alienation of
affection.' s
An action by a child to recover for the loss of his parent's "consortium" is the
latest development in this area of the law and has met with the least approval.
No such action could be maintained at common law'0 and the courts reflect this
attitude in their reluctance to sanction it now. The first case to permit a child
to recover for the willful enticement of his father was Daily v. Parher.' While
the decision in that case has been followed in several jurisdictionsi2' at least an
equal number have adopted a contrary rule.22 The difference seems to result
from a choice between the theoretical reasons for, and the practical reasons
against permitting such an action-a choice which has been called a matter of
opinion 3 Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospita2 4 is among the few cases to be
found where an infant plaintiff has predicated his action for loss of consortium
on the negligent conduct of the defendant. While expressing sympathy for the
plaintiff's case, the court felt constrained by the trend of higher court decisions,
concerning willful wrongs, to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. Nowhere
within the continental United States has relief been granted under these circum-
stances but the question has not as yet been posed in a jurisdiction where a
child's action for willful enticement of its parent had been previously permitted.
Striking indeed is the arbitrary treatment accorded the basic rights flowing from
the family relationship. Where the basis of the action, loss of consortium,
remains constant throughout, why should not each member of the family have
an equal opportunity to be compensated?
Where a wife or child has been permitted to maintain an action for loss of
consortium the courts have considered the practical objections advanced and
dismissed them as uncontrolling. There can be no objection of a double recovery
since the husband in his own action is not compensated for the loss of the
sentimental aspects of consortium suffered by his family.2 The injury is not
too remote but is directly caused by the defendant's interference with the family
relationship 2 6 As to absence of precedent, it has been repeatedly held that this
13. Kasiski v. Central Power & Light Co, 4 N.J. Misc. 130, 132 At. 201 (Sup. Ct.
1926).
16. Howell v. Howell, 162 N.C. 283, 78 S.E. 222 (1913).
17. Beaudette v. Gagne, 87 Mle. 534, 33 AtL 23 (1895).
18. Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 210 N.W. 926 (1926).
19. Pound, Individual Interests In the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177, 183
(1916).
20. 152 F. 2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945).
21. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (1949) ; Johnson v. Luhman, 330
Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E. 2d 810 (1947).
22. McMillan v. Taylor, 1460 F. 2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Taylor v. Keefe, 134 Conn. 136,
56 A. 2d 763 (1947).
23. See 162 A.L.R. 819, 826 (1946).
24. 103 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952).
25. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 US. 832
(1950).




alone is not sufficient reason for dismissing an action.2 7 Nor are the damages too
uncertain for it is the fact of damage that must be shown with certainty not the
amount thereof.28 Finally, it is objected that recognition of such actions would
produce a flood of litigation. This reason has been summarily dismissed in cases
of wrongful death where similar actions are constantly entertained.2 9 Cases
supporting the right in the child have chosen to base their decisions on principle
rather than expediency, arguing that if the remedy for the harm done is avail-
able to one it should be available to all.
The instant case represents the most advanced attitude in Anglo-American
jurisdictions towards recognition of relational interests. The decision rested on
a logical application of decided principles,80 supported by a Hawaiian statute
that recognizes the intangibles of family-life as computable items of damage.8'
The evolution of the law governing actions of this nature has been painfully
slow and the decided cases cannot be reconciled. The archaic fiction of loss of
services is no longer seriously contended to be the basis of the action.3 2 More
recent cases have recognized the loss of the elements of consortium as the true
root of the injury but, where the action has already been denied, precedent is
said to prevent change.3 3 Legal writers, unhampered by precedent, have viewed
the problem in its modern perspective. 34 It is argued, with reason, that the
courts have failed to keep pace with fundamental changes in the concept of the
family and the tendency toward equalizing the rights of all its members. Each
has an interest in the preservation of the unity of the family and a right to have
that unity remain undisturbed. Any unlawful interference, regardless of how
it is caused, is to be guarded against and redressed when committed. Courts
and authors alike have recognized the unsatisfactory state of the law on the
subject and all agree that some uniformity should be achieved. Since a desirable
solution lies beyond the power of many courts, the appeal of all has been directed
to the legislature.35
27. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
28. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W. 2d 543 (1949).
29. Ibid. See Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 104, 120 N.E.
198, 199 (1918), "The family becomes a legal unit, invested with rights of its own, invested
with an interest in the continued life of its members, much as it was in primitive law. .. "
30. Scruggs v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955) (cases cited showing the
development of the Hawaiian law).
31. Rev. Laws Hawaii 1945, § 10494 as added by Laws Hawaii 1953, Act 206; Laws
Hawaii 1955, § 205.
32. Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F. 2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 852 (1950).
33. Hill v. Sibley, 108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952).
34. See, Prosser, Torts, § 103, at 696; § 104, at 705 (2d ed. 1955); Pound, Individual
Interests In the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich. L. Rev. 177 (1916) ; Green, Relational Interests:
Family Relations, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 460 (1934); 14 La. L. Rev. 713 (1954); 6 Okla. L. Rev.
500 (1953) ; 20 Corn. L.Q. 255 (1935).
35. The enactment of so-called Heart Balm statutes in a number of states has drastically
curtailed actions for alienation of affection and related injuries. Also, the enactment of
Dram-Shop acts have given the wife and child a right of action against those who sell the
husband or father intoxicating beverages.
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Torts-Federal Tort Claims Act-Liability of the United States for Negli-
gent Maintenance of Lighthouse.-Plaintiff's tugboat ran aground on an
island, resulting in the loss of its towed cargo of phosphate. The island
was marked by a lighthouse maintained by the United States Coast Guard.
Plaintiff, alleging the negligent operation and maintenance of the light as the
proximate cause of the damage, commenced suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The District Court dismissed the complaint on defendant's motion, holding
that the United States was not liable under the circumstances alleged. The
Circuit Court affirmed, per curiam, and certiorari was granted. The Supreme
Court, by an equally divided bench, sustained the courts below, but allowed a
petition to reargue. Upon reargument, held, four justices dissenting, reversed.
Where the United States undertakes to supply lighthouse service it must ex-
ercise reasonable care, and its failure to do so will subject it to liability under
the act; the operation of a lighthouse is an activity for which a private indi-
vidual under similar circumstances could incur liability in tort within the
meaning of the statute. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
At common law the sovereign was immune from suit.1 With the growth of
national states, the sovereign immunity was predicated of the national govern-
ment and additionally, in the United States, of the governments of the several
states.2 The privilege was absolute and completely precluded suit against the
state unless it consented to be sued by legislative act.a On the other hand,
political sub-divisions of the state enjoyed only a qualified privilege which ex-
tended immunity solely to "governmental" functions and not to wrongs result-
ing from "proprietary" activities.4 The injustices arising from the sovereign
immunity doctrine led to the enactment of federal and state legislation waiving
the immunity to a greater or lesser degree and allowing suit without the aid of
special legislation which had proved a clumsy and ineffective vehicle.5 The
waiver of federal tort immunity0 was embraced in the Tort Claims Act,7 initially
1. Prosser, Torts § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 271 (18250); United States v. McLemore, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1S45); Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71 (18S4).
3. United SF',tes v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940); United States v. Etf ord, 73 US. (6
Wall.) 484 (1867); Lewis v. State, 96 N.Y. 71 (1834).
4. 18 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 53.23 (3d ed. 1950). This distinction, grant-
ing immunity in some roles and withholding it in others, has led to much confusion and
much mntidism as noted by the Court in the instant case. 350 U.S. at 65.
5. Even where these statutes have allowed suit against the state, they have, in many
jurisdictions, either specifically excluded tort claims or have been so construed. On the
other hand, some statutes and court rulings have extended the waiver to tort suits. In New
York, for example, not only has this statute been held applicable to tort claims, but also
the waiver of state immunity has been extended to the political sub-dividons of the state.
Bernardine v. New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 2d 604 (1945); Hobms v. County of
Erie, 291 N.Y. 79S, 53 N.E. 2d 369 (1944). See Leflar and Kantorwitz, Tort Liability of
the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363 (1954), for a definitive survey of the current state of
the law in this matter.
6. The general waiver of federal immunity in other fields is codified in the Court of
Claims Act, 28 US.C.A. c. 91.
7. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671,0. As to
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passed in 1946. Under the act liability is imposed on the United States for
the negligence8 of its employees and agents acting within the scope of their
employment where a "private individual" would be liable, under the laws of the
locality where the wrong occurred.9 The liability however is limited by certain
specific exceptions' ° and a broad general exception which renders non-actionable
the acts or omissions of government agents in situations calling for the exercise
of discretion."
In the instant case, the government argued that no cause of action was main-
tainable since there was no private liability corresponding to that alleged against
the government in the operation of a lighthouse. The Court, however, gave a
literal reading to the language of the statute. The insistence of the defendant
that private individuals do not and by law cannot operate lighthouses 12 is
unconvincing, since the act does not demand exactly similar private liability
but only "like" liability. To quote the Court: ". . . [w]e would be attributing
bizarre motives to Congress were we to hold that it was predicating liability on
such a completely fortuitous circumstance-the presence or absence of identical
private activity."' 3 The dissent, in supporting the defendant's contention that
no liability can attach where only the government could have performed the
activity involved, relied heavily on the case of Feres v. United States14 where
recovery was denied servicemen injured through the alleged negligence of
superior officers. The Feres case appears readily distinguishable, however, for
there recovery was denied due to the "distinctly federal" character of the re-
lationship existing between the wronged and the wrongdoer.'r The emphasis
was placed on the relationship, not the function or capacity of the government.
This distinction is brought out in Brooks v. United States,1' where even though
the injured party was a serviceman, and was injured by an Army vehicle, re-
covery was allowed because the relationship did not exist, the soldier being
off-duty when the wrong occurred.
tort claims against the federal government prior to this act see Gottileb, Tort Claims Against
the United States, 30 Geo. L.J. 462 (1942). It had been held, prior to this legislation, that
the United States had never consented to be sued at tort. Hill v. United States, 149 U.S.
593 (1893); Sultzbach Clothing Co. v. United States, 10 F. 2d 363 (W.D. N.Y. 1925).
8. Liability for wilful torts against the person is specifically excluded. 28 U.S.C.A. §
2680(h).
9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674.
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (b) (loss of mail), (c) (assessment or collection of taxes),
(d) (admiralty matters covered by other provisions of the Code), (e) (administering of
§§ 1-31 of Title 50 of the Code), (f) (establishment of quarantine), (g) (injury to vessels
in the Panama Canal Zone), (h) (wilful torts against the person), (i) (regulation of money
by the Treasury), (j) (combat activities of the military in time of war), (k) (claims
arising in a foreign country), (I) (activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority), (m) (activi-
ties of the Panama Railroad Company).
11. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a).
12. 14 U.S.C.A. § 83.
13. 350 U.S. at 67.
14. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
15. Id. at 143-44.
16. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
[Vol. 25
The government in the present case did not invoke the "discretionary" ex-
emption although it has done so in the past and generally has met with
favorable response from the courts.' 7 While not presented with this defense,
the tenor of the Court in the instant decision seems to run contra in spirit to
its holding in Dalehite v. United States,18 where it was held that all the in-
stances of negligence of government agents in the manufacture, handling and
shipping of fertilizer which subsequently exploded, were covered by this ex-
emption. In the course of that opinion, the Court specifically rejected the
claimant's contention that the exemption existed only at the executive level and
held that it covered all the acts of subordinates in the execution of plans and
programs initiated by executives.19 As a general statement of the law, this
appears to be sound. It is reasonable to assume that the exemption was intended
to absolve the government from liability for the results of ill-conceived plans and
programs formulated by executives in the exercise of their discretion. It is also
reasonable to extend this protection to the careful acts of subordinates in carry-
ing out such plans and programs. But in the Dalehite case, among the items
of negligence alleged was the failure of government agents to take suitable
precautions in the handling of a known dangerous commodity. In particular,
it failed to notify subsequent handlers of the dangerous characteristics of the
fertilizer. The Court suggested that such lapses are not actionable because the
choice to act or not to act involves discretion even where the defendant was on
notice of the probable dangers involved. The Court found as matter of fact
that there was no misfeasance involved but disregarded palpable non-feasance.
It would seem to defeat the entire purpose of the act to hold that once the
exemption is given to an activity, its protective cloak should cover all the
failures to exercise even a modicum of care, and that a subordinate's strict
adherence to executive directions affords an excuse for non-feasance. It is
doubtful if the present Court would so argue. Here, one of the omissions of
the government that the Court found actionable was the failure to give warning
to others of a known dangerous condition. The overall plan for the operation
and maintenance of lighthouses is assuredly well within the "discretionary"
exemption at executive level and yet this Court finds in the failure of subordi-
nates to act, a breach of a duty owed to others.20 Certainly the agents in charge
17. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Good%,ill Industries v. United States,
218 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954); National Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263
(8th Cir. 1954).
18. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
19. The Dalehite Court said that discretion includes: ... more than the initiation of
programs and activities.... Where there is room for policy judgment ... there is discretion.
It necessarily follows that the acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of govern-
ment in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable?' Id. at 35-36. Carrying
this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, it may be possible to completely eliminate
governmental liability. Where must the line be drawn? See Note, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 4S
(1953), for a critical survey of the Dalehite decision and its possible inference.
20. .. . . the Coast Guard was further obligated to use due care to discover this fact
[that the light was not in working order] and to repair the light or give warning that it
was not functioning." 350 U.S. at 69. See also, United States v. White1 211 F. 2d 79
(9th Cir. 1954).
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of the manufacture and shipping of the fertilizer in the Dalehite case were
under no less an obligation. It is submitted that the duty to act is inconsistent
with the choice of whether to act or not to act, possibly even at executive level2"
and that once that duty is found the "discretionary" exemption dissappears.
The instant holding appears to indicate a significant expansion of the area
of federal liability beyond the narrow restrictions imposed, by inference at
least, in the Dalehite case. It may be suggested in passing that the fact that
Dalehite was a test case upon the outcome of which depended the disposition
of some two hundred million dollars in claims growing out of the Texas City
disaster, may have had an important, though unexpressed effect on that decision.
The instant result seems to be a fairer interpretation of the statute without
doing violence to the limitations placed upon it by Congress.
Torts-Recovery for Physical Illness or Injury Resulting from Mental or
Emotional Disturbance.-Plaintiff's daughter in Tulsa, Oklahoma, sent plain-
tiff, a resident of Dallas, Texas, a telegram stating that the daughter would
arrive that evening in Dallas. Defendant Western Union Telegraph Company
negligently transmitted the wire as a "death message" in which form it was
delivered to the plaintiff. Immediately on receipt of the message plaintiff became
violently ill and entered into a state of shock necessitating prolonged medical
treatment and leaving her in generally poor health. Plaintiff alleged that
defendant's negligence in transmission was the proximate cause of the physical
illness she suffered. From a summary judgment for the defendant, plaintiff
appealed. Held, one judge dissenting, reversed and remanded. Damages may
be recovered for illness resulting from a negligently caused mental disturbance.
Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 24 U.S.L. Week 3191 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1956) (No. 533).1
Psychic stimuli with resultant physical harm are broadly divided into two
groups in determining legal liability: those which are intentionally caused by
the defendant and those which are the result of his negligent actions.2 Where
the defendant's act was intentional and where the emotional upset resulted in
21. See dissenting opinion, Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57-60 (1953).
1. In the District Court defendant's motion for summary judgment on the pleadings
was granted. Ruling that this judgment was error unless sustained by defendant's affirmative
defenses, the Circuit Court reviewed each defense raised and rejected them all. The court
contended that the only substantial point introduced by the defendant was his assertion
that the federal courts do not recognize as compensable physical injury springing from a
purely mental condition. The opinion exhaustively reviewed this contention, finally dl-
missing it as well.
2. See, Bohlen & Polikoff, Liability in New York for the Physical Consequences of Emo-
tional Disturbance, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 409 (1932); Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as
Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497 (1922); Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936); McNiece, Psychic Inquiry and Tort
Liability in New York, 24 St. Johns L. Rev. 1 (1949); Smith, Relation of Emotions to
Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193 (1944).
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physical illness or injury, the courts almost universally find a compensable
cause of action, straining at times to suggest a variety of theories on which to
predicate liability.3
On the other hand, where the psychic stimuli are negligently produced and
illness or injury results, there is a splintering of authorities. The early cases
recognized no recovery for such injuries citing lack of foreseeability and the
difficulties of valid medical proof. Harsh rules were developed in many jurisdic-
tions to deny compensation for injuries of this nature in spite of the obvious
harm that the plaintiff had suffered. In New York the controversial case of
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.4 established the "impact rule" which is still nominally
the law of New York after nearly sixty years. This doctrine denies recovery
for fright and its physical and mental consequences where the cause is purely
the defendant's negligence unless a physical contact with the plaintiff can be
established. As a consequence of this much-criticized holding the New York
courts have assiduously toiled to find contact or battery where under other
circumstances, none would have been deemed to exist 5
3. Since the present case carries no suggestion that any wilful element was invoved,
the discussion here will be limited to negligently caused emotional distre s. For a discumsion
of intentionally produced emotional distress see Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: a New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874 (1939).
4. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). In this case plaintiff was denied recovery for
physical injuries (miscarriage) produced by fright which was a result of the defendant's
negligence. There was no impact with the plaintiff nor element of wilfulnis_ on the part
of the defendant. The court put its decision on a threefold basis: (1) the flood of litiga-
tion that would result if such injuries be compensated; (2) the impo-ssibility of scientifically
linking the injury with the mental condition; (3) because no recovery for fright alone is
allowed there should be none for its physical consequences.
5. Analogous cases in which recoveries have been allowed may be clzslficd into three
main types.
(I) The food cases: Plaintiff, after discovering foreign material in food, is revolted to
the point of nausea. Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Mise. 835, 211 N.Y. Supp. S2
(2d Dep't 1925) (cockroaches in a charlotte russe).
(2) The immediate impact cases: Closely following an emotional shock, a physical injury
results to plaintiff. Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 143 N.Y. Supp. 39
(1st Dep't 1914) (plaintiff, a mother, fainted and fell into an elevator shaft on seeing her
children ascend in an unattended car).
(3) The slight impact cases: The technical battery to a passenger in an auto collision
(though preceding nervous shock) held enough to allow recovery for subsequent emotional
disturbance followed by bodily injury. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431
(1931) (recovery allowed where woman pasenger, after accident, fainted from nervousnez:,
fractured her skull and died).
See also the recent case of Williams v. State, 303 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E2d 54S (1955). Here
recovery was granted plaintiff where defendant's servants had negligently allowed a convict
to escape from prison. The convict accosted plaintiff's decedent, resulting in fright and
consequent death of decedent from a cerebral hemorrhage. The Court of Claims and the
Appellate Division found a causal relationship between defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
testators injury. However, in the Court of Appeals the existence of defendant's negligence
was denied to be the proximate cause as a matter of law. Referring to the state's conten-
tion that the Mitchell rule would preclude recovery in any case, the court nimbly sldestepped
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Most federal courts6 and those of the larger industrial states7 follow the
Mitchell case, while a scattering of federal jurisdictions and a majority of the
state courts8 allow recovery for injuries of the Mitchell type. Even though
the array on the side of the minority still appears formidable, the decisions in
these jurisdictions are rife with exceptions and hairline distinctions that are un-
doubted recognitions of the obsolete reasoning underlying the cases denying
recovery. With modem medicine's advance in the treatment and understanding
of the human mind and of the relationship between physical manifestations and
mental processes, the old arguments of lack of foreseeability and the scientific
inability to differentiate between actual and feigned mental distress have ceased
to be valid reasons to deny compensation. In this regard, denying all recoveries
as a matter of public policy to forestall a plaintiff falsely asserting mental or
emotional injury can no longer be justified.
While the Circuit Court in the instant case conceded that an action, cannot
be maintained under federal law for mental suffering alone,0 it underscored the
the issue saying, "in the absence of any proximate causation between the State's act and
Williams' death we do not reach this question." Williams v. State, supra at 557.
6. See note 9 infra. See also Mees v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 F. 2d 691 (S.D. Fla.
1932); Jones v. Western Union Tel. Co., 233 F. 301 (S.D. Cal. 1916); Tyler v. Western
Union Tel Co., 54 F. 634 (Cir. Ct. W.D. Va. 1893).
7. Elgin A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson, 217 Ill. 47, 75 N.E. 436 (1905); Spade v.
Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich.
157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923); Porter v. Del. L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 At]. 860 (Sup.
Ct. 1906); Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908);
Howarth v. Adams Express Co., 269 Pa. 280, 112 AtI. 536 (1921).
8. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Sloane v. Southern Cal.
Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320 (1896); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d
402 (1941); Williamson v. Central of Georgia Ry., 127 Ga. 125, 56 S.E. 119 (1906); Clemm
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928); Laird v. Natchitoches
Oil Mill, Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 120 So. 692 (1929); Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397,
165 AtI. 182 (1933); Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892);
Cashin v. Northern Pac. Ry., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. 2d 862 (1934); Hanford v. Omaha &
C. B. Ry., 173 Neb. 423, 203 N.W. 643 (1925); Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesale
Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 AtI. 540 (1930); Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E.
778 (1906); Sami v. Columbia & N. Ry., 75 Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915); Simone v.
Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 AtI. 202 (1907); Mac v. South-Bound R.R., 52 S.C.
323, 29 S.E. 905 (1898) ; Sternhagen v. Kozel, 40 S.D. 396, 167 N.W. 398, (1918) ; Memphis
St. Ry. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hayter,
93 Tex. 239, 54 S.W. 944 (1900); Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932);
Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. 2d 1037 (1935); Lambert v.
Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124, 125 S.E. 224 (1924); Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123
N.W. 625 (1909).
9. For authority see: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920), where a
misdirected wire caused plaintiff to fail to attend his father's funeral; Southern Express Co.
v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1916), in which mental pain and suffering are held too vague for
redress where there was no physical injury to the person; Chesapeake and Potomac Tel.
Co. v. Clay, 194 F. 2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1952), worry owing to defendant's negligence in fall-
ing to change a phone number, held non-compensable if unaccompanied by a physical injury.
In the case of Stanley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 23 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Fla. 1938) It was
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fact that here physical illness followed the mental distress and that the Supreme
Court has not yet passed on a case containing this added element. Two cases
are cited in the opinion to support the view that the injury suffered, though
mentally induced, was compensable: Baltimore & O.R.R. v. McBride0 and
Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.P In the former case, decided by the
United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit, a railroad engineer jumped from
his engine after a steam valve burst and flooded the cab with live steam. He
was hurt by the fall and while lying across the track, was terrified by the sight
of another train approaching him. The court held that the shock to his nervous
system was compensable even though he was not hit by the second train since
both the shock and the injury were proximately caused by the same negligent
act. In the latter case, decided by the Tenth Circuit, the plaintiff, immediately
after being struck by a train and immobilized, observed another engine bearing
down on him from the opposite direction. Here the court reasoned that mental
suffering and shock constitute physical injury and are therefore compensable.
It stated that "... the majority of courts compensate for bodily injuries pro-
duced by or resulting from mental disturbances, although unaccompanied by
any physical impact or concussion. In such cases, the right to recover is de-
pendent upon the nature of the results rather than the nature of the tortious
conduct."' 2
While the cited cases bear no close factual resemblance to the principal
decision they do represent the highest federal authority the Fifth Circuit could
muster to support a recovery. Because it agreed with the rationale of the Bell
and Baltimore cases and since the "... . injustice of denying legal redress to a
person wrongfully and seriously injured as alleged in the present complaint
outweighs in our minds the policy considerations which some courts have held
to prevent a recovery. . . ,113 the Fifth Circuit felt the complaint stated a cause
of action.
While no mention of the fact is made in its opinion, the court may have felt
that a greater than ordinary degree of care should have been exercised by
defendant, a public communications company. In any case, by aligning itself
squarely with the majority of jurisdictions and allowing a recovery for negli-
gently caused psychic disturbance resulting in physical illness, the Fifth Circuit
has dealt a worthy blow to an outmoded doctrine whose existence is no longer
justified in a modem jurisprudence.
urged by the plaintiff that since the Federal Communications Act, 47 US.C.A. §§ 205, 207,
provided that the "full amount of damages sustained" should be recovered, this act enlarged
the scope of damages to include mental anguish. The court held that this act was to be
interpreted in the same way as language of the Interstate Commerce Act. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 8,
9, thereby denying such recovery.
10. 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1930).
11. 195 F. 2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952).
12. Id. at 243.
13. Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F. 2d 723, 731 (5th Cir. 19SS), cert.
denied, 24 U.S.L. Week 3191 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1956) (No. 533).
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Workmen's Compensation - Indemnity Action Under Longshorcmen's
and Harbor Workers' Act.-Stevedoring contractor's longshoreman-employee
was severely injured while working aboard ship. The employee accepted com-
pensation, but without a formal award; he then instituted a third party suit
against the shipowner, who impleaded the stevedore-employer. The United
States District Court allowed a $75,000 recovery by the longshoreman against
the shipowner but denied the shipowner's claim for indemnity from the steve-
dore. The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, affirmed the longshoreman's recovery
but reversed the dismissal of the indemnity suit and directed judgment to be
entered for the shipowner. The stevedore contended this reversal was erroneous.
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, held, four justices dissenting, affirmed.
Breach of the stevedore's contractual obligation to perform in a workmanlike
manner entitled the shipowner to indemnity from the stevedore, notwithstanding
the shipowner's failure to discover and correct the breach. Neither the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act nor the absence of an
express indemnity agreement precludes such a recovery. Ryan Stevedoring Co.
v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
After holding that longshoremen were not included within the provisions of
state workmen's compensation acts,' the Supreme Court, in an effort to afford
longshoremen some relief, held them to be within the provisions of the Jones
Act.2 This proved unsatisfactory, 3 and Congress in 1927, enacted the Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act 4 which required an employer to pay an
employee, injured in the course of employment, compensation according to a
fixed schedule, without regard to fault. While the longshoreman retained his
rights against third parties,5 the statutory liability of the employer was to be
exclusive.8
Third party and related contribution and indemnity actions were rare for
some time after the passage of the act because of two factors: (1) under the
original act acceptance of compensation was an election of remedies 7 and, (2) a
1. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Two congressional attempts to
reverse this result were declared unconstitutional. Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S.
219 (1924) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
2. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
3. The longshoremen, through counsel, told Congress they wanted, "compensation as
against employer's liability." Ambler, Seamen Are "Wards of the Admiralty" But Long-
shoremen Are Now More Privileged, 29 Wash. L. Rev. 243, 255 (1954).
4. 33 U.S.C.A. § 901.
5. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933 (a), which provides, "If on account of a disability . . . the person
entitled to such compensation . . .may elect . . . to receive such compensation or to recover
damages against such third person."
6. 33 U.S.C.A. § 05, which provides, "The liability of an employer . . . shall be exclu-
sive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representa-
tive . . . and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer ... on
account of such injury . ... "
7. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(b), provided, "Acceptance of such compensation shall operate as
an assignment to the employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover
damages against such third person ... " See American Stevedores v. Porrello, 330 U.S.
446, 454 (1947).
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longshoreman had to establish negligence to recover from a shipowner.8 Thus
in most instances a longshoreman who was injured aboard ship, rather than
chance an expensive and lengthy tort action against the shipowner accepted
compensation. Then in 1938 Congress amended the act to provide that only an
acceptance of compensation under a formal award by the Deputy Commissioner
constituted such an election of remedies.2 This allowed the longshoreman, after
acceptance of an informal award, to sue also the shipowner for negligence10
The second factor limiting contribution and indemnity litigation was overthrown
in 1946, when the Supreme Court in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sicrachill held that
the absolute duty of seaworthiness a shipowner owes to seamen, also applies to
longshoremen. Thus if the injury to the longshoreman is caused by the unsea-
worthy condition of the ship, the shipowner is absolutely liable to him.'2
Where the shipowner and the stevedore were joint tortfeasors the shipowner
sought contribution, arguing that since both were equally at fault, they should
share the burden of damages. However, in 1952 the Supreme Court in Halcyon
Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,"2 held no right of contribution
exists, on the ground that in admiralty the doctrine is confined to collision cases.
But as the Court in the instant case points out, Halcyon Lines operates only as
a bar to contribution suits.
It is clear that the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
does not preclude an express indemnity agreement between the parties, though
even here problems of interpertation have arisen.14 Furthermore, even in the
absence of an express indemnity clause, there has been a growing body of case
law allowing indemnity,'5 although the exact basis for recovery has been some-
what vague. Where a contractual relationship existed between the parties
recovery has been based on either this relationship itself'0 or the relationship
S. Panama Mail S.S. Co. v. Davis, 79 F. 2d 430 (3d Cir. 1935); see citations collected
in 34 Calif. L. Rev. 601, 602 n. 6 (1946).
9. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(b).
10. Compensation in the usual case is not controverted but paid without a formal award.
Weinstock, The Employer's Duty To Indemnify Shipowners For Damagc, Recovered By
Harbor Workers, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 321, 322 n. 5 (1954).
11. 323 U.S. 85 (1946). For criticism of this case see Dickinson and Andrew, A Decade
of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of the United States, 36 Calif. L. Rev. 169, 190 (194S).
See also, 34 Calif. L. Rev. 601 (1946), 45 Colum. L. Rev. 957 (1945), 59 Harv. L. Rev.
127 (1945), 19 Temp. L.Q. 339 (1945).
12. This warranty of seaworthiness is not as narrow and confining as it may sound.
Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F. 2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396 (1954) (defec-
ive equipment supplied by a stevedore renders a ship unseaworthy); Strika v. Netherlands
Ministry of Traffic, 185 F. 2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950) (permitting recovery for the unseaworthy
condition of ship by longshoreman who was not aboard ship when injured).
13. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
14. American Stevedores v. Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947) (holding such a cause ambiguous
and remanding the case to trial court to ascertain the intention of the parties).
IS. Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners For Damages Recovered
By Harbor Workers, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 321 (1954).
16. Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 205 F. 2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953); Read v. United
States, 201 F. 2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953).
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and a test of active, sole or primary negligence. 17 One case has allowed indem-
nity in the complete absence of a contractual relationship. 18
The Court in the instant case predicated the stevedore-contractor's indemnity
liability on the breach of his contractual duty, i.e., to perform the work in a
reasonably safe manner. The shipowner's liability to the injured longshoreman
was a proximate result of the stevedore's failure to perform safely, the promise
for which implies a promise of indemnity. Such is the Court's reasoning, with
the result that the stevedore, stripped of the exclusive liability that Congress
enacted for its benefit, is at least liable for compensation and at most bears the
ultimate loss of a large recovery by the longshoreman from the shipowner. The
practical result of the decision, as the dissent points out, will be that the steve-
doring contractor, by controverting the longshoreman's claim, will force him, if
he accepts, to do so under a formal award and thus put the stevedore in control
of any third party suit.19 The act provides that where an employer controverts
a claim he must, within a short time, state in writing to the commissioner his
reasons for so doing.20 Whether or not he can arbitrarily controvert a claim
remains to be seen.2 ' It would seem that the conclusion of the Court is violative of
congressional intent as well as the intention of the parties to the contract. Notwith-
standing, to deny a third party indemnity where he would otherwise be entitled
to it, merely because the person he sues happens to be under a compensation
act seems unjust. The third party receives no quid pro quo for surrendering his
common law right of indemnification. 22
Perhaps the interests of all parties would best be served by a compromise.
The Supreme Court in the Halcyon Lines case, in denying the right of contribu-
tion stated that it was not opposed to such a doctrine but felt that any change
should come through congressional action.23 Legislation covering both contribu-
tion and indemnity suits in this field, apportioning damages according to the
comparative fault of the shipowner and the stevedore, would perhaps be the
flexible test required to reach an equitable result in all cases. The objection that
a comparative test of fault would increase litigation has not been borne out by
experience; 24 furthermore, applied to this specific field such a test might reduce
17. Berti v. Compagnie De Navigation Cyprien Fabre, 213 F. 2d 397 (2d Cir. 1954);
Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F. 2d 277 (2d Cir. 1954).
18. States S.S. Co. v. Rothchild Int'l Stevedoring Co., 205 F. 2d 253 (9th Cir. 1953),
67 Harv. L. Rev. 884 (1954). Contra, Brown v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 211 F. 2d
16 (3d Cir. 1954).
19. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(b).
20. 33 U.S.C.A. § 914(d).
21. Assuming he can, most likely an insurance carrier, not the employer would gain
control of any third party suit. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(i). Then too, some organization might
advance the longshoreman funds thereby enabling him to forego such an acceptance and
retain control of any third party suit.
22. The longshoremen while surrendering their common law remedies against the employer
did acquire the right to compensation regardless of fault.
23. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
24. Prosser, Torts, 297 (2d ed. 1955).
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rather than increase litigation.25 An alternative plan requiring the shipowner
to carry compensation insurance and making him, as well as the stevedore, the
employer of a longshoreman who is injured aboard ship for purposes of com-
pensation might be feasible. In the absence of such legislation an e-press clause
exemptive of indemnification would appear to be the stevedore's only recourse.
25. If Congress thought it advisable they could abolish the doctrine of the Slerackd case.
In that event the shipowner's negligence would have to first be establhed before the issue
of indemnity or contribution would arise.
